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I. INTRODUCTION
N November 2014, Ryan Ferguson walked out of the Jefferson City
Correctional Center a free man after spending more than a decade in
a prison for a crime many people believe he did not commit. In 2005,
when he was just twenty-one years old, Ferguson was convicted of killing
a local newspaper reporter.' Although there was no physical evidence
tying Ferguson to the murder, he was convicted based primarily on the
testimony of an alleged co-conspirator, Charles Erickson, and another
eyewitness, Jerry Trump. 2 Erickson had been picked up by local police
officers after telling his friends that he had "dream like" memories about
the murder.3 While being questioned by the officers, Erickson confessed
to the crime, and that confession implicated Ferguson. 4 Erickson later
testified against Ferguson in exchange for a lesser sentence.5 The other
eyewitness, Trump, testified that he had seen Ferguson at the scene of the
crime-a memory that he was unable to recall when first questioned by
the police but instead recalled at some later time.6 After unsuccessfully
appealing his case, Ferguson finally had his conviction vacated in 2013 on
habeas corpus review. 7 Although the court did not rule on Ferguson's
actual innocence-instead vacating the conviction on the ground that the
government had failed to produce exculpatory material as required by
Brady v. Maryland8-it did express significant doubts that the govern-
ment would want to retry Ferguson.9 Among the reasons the court cited
were that Erickson had recanted his testimony implicating Ferguson,
Trump had recanted his identification of Ferguson, Trump had stated that
he felt that the police pressured him into identifying Ferguson, a third
witness had testified that Ferguson was not the man observed at the scene
of the crime, and yet another witness had testified that she had seen Fer-
guson elsewhere around the same time that the crime was committed. 10
Ferguson's story is not unique. 1 There are hundreds of reports of
1. See Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
2. See id. at 46-47.
3. See id. at 46.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 47.
7. See id. at 73 ("As a result of our grant of habeas relief, Ferguson's convictions are
vacated.").
8. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. See Ferguson, 413 S.W.3d at 71-73.
10. See id. at 72-73.
11. While there have been hundreds of wrongful convictions in this country, Fergu-
son's case is unique in one respect-that it is so well known. E-mail from Kathleen Zellner,
Founding Partner, Law Offices of Kathleen T. Zellner & Associates (July 21, 2014) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Zeliner E-mail]. This is in large part due to "his use of social
media to garner support." Id. "Ferguson had over 350,000 Facebook followers, his
Facebook page generated over 1 million hits, and all three major networks profiled Fergu-
son's case in multiple stories." Id.
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wrongful convictions from across the country. 12 The reasons for these
wrongful convictions vary.13 According to a report by the National Regis-
try of Exonerations, 56% of known wrongful convictions in 2013 were a
result of perjury and false accusations, 46% were the product of official
misconduct, 38% could be attributed to mistaken witness identifications,
22% arose out of false or misleading evidence, and 12% resulted from
false confessions.14 In some of these instances, like in Ferguson's case,
courts are able to vacate the defendant's sentence based on legal errors
that occurred at trial. In other cases, defendants have also been able to
prove that they are actually innocent of the crimes for which they were
convicted.' 5 And there likely are cases in which innocent defendants are
unable to gain any relief whatsoever. In any of these scenarios, establish-
ing that one has been wrongfully convicted is an uphill battle. Still, with
the explosion of the use of DNA evidence in our criminal justice system,
a number of defendants have been able to establish that they were
wrongfully convicted. 16 And more recently there have even been addi-
tional exonerations that are not based on new DNA evidence.' 7
A significant number of defendants claim innocence, but it is difficult
to pinpoint the number of wrongful convictions that have actually oc-
curred.1 8 At the high end, a study commissioned by the Department of
Justice suggests that the rate of wrongful conviction could be as high as
12. See NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2013 1 (2014)
[hereinafter EXONERATIONS IN 2013], http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Doc-
uments/Exonerations-in_2013_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/X36N-FTG5].
13. See id. at 17.
14. See id.; cf SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 40
(2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations us 1989
2012_full-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/2VDH-H77A] (stating in the year of publication that
51% of known wrongful convictions were a result of perjury and false accusations, 42%
were the product of official misconduct, 43% can be attributed to mistaken witness identi-
fications, 24% arose out of false or misleading evidence, and 15% resulted from of false
confessions). However, each case tends to have multiple factors contributing to the error,
and the frequency of the factors varies considerably depending on the crime. See EXONER-
ATIONS IN 2013, supra, at 17; GROSS & SHAFFER, supra, at 41. For example, mistaken eye-
witness identification has been a contributing factor in 82% of wrongful robbery
convictions and 75% of wrongful sexual assault cases, but only 26% of wrongful homicide
convictions. See EXONERATIONS IN 2013, supra, at 17. On the other hand, false confessions
occurred in 20% of wrongful homicide convictions, but in only 1% of wrongful robbery
convictions. See id.
15. See, e.g., Brown v. State, No. 113684 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Oct. 20, 2008), http://ver-
tumnus.courts.state.ny.us/claims/html/2008-009-029.html [http://perma.cc/3ENT-LSDZ]
(granting a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in his wrongful conviction claim
against the state after serving fifteen years in prison).
16. See GRoss & SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 22.
17. See Non-DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PRoJECT, http://www.innocenceproject
.org/know/non-dna-exonerations.php [http://perma.cc/8Q6Q-24FG] (offering the stories of
several wrongfully convicted individuals who were exonerated through means other than
DNA evidence).
18. Part of this dispute arises from a lack of consistency in defining "wrongfully con-
victed." Much of the dispute can be attributed to the fact that there are real limits to
available reliable data in this area. See KEITH A. FINDLEY, Wrongful Conviction, ENCY-




15%. 19 At the low end, a county district attorney from Oregon has esti-
mated that the rate of wrongful conviction is probably closer to 0.027%.20
Justice Scalia alluded to this lower figure in his 2006 concurrence to Kan-
sas v. Marsh.21 Professor Michael Risinger has argued that the real rate of
wrongful conviction lies somewhere in the middle-at around 3.3% to
5%.22 Still others have suggested that the rate may be closer to 0.84%.23
These estimates of the frequency of wrongful conviction are in large
part derived from the number of exonerations in this country. Since 1989,
over 1,700 individuals have been exonerated of the crimes for which they
were convicted. 24 This represents less than 0.1% of the approximately 2.4
19. See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., POST CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND WRONGFUL CON-
VICTION 5-6 (2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412589-Post-Conviction-DNA-
Testing-and-Wrongful-Conviction.pdf [http://perma.cc/966F-SGUB] (finding that, from a
sample of 422 sexual assault "convictions in Virginia between 1973 and 1987 where evi-
dence was retained[,] . . . [t]he convicted offender was eliminated as the source of ques-
tioned evidence.., where a determination could be made from the DNA analysis, and that
elimination was supportive of exoneration[,]" in 15% of cases); see also Stephanie Roberts
Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Piecemeal Prob-
lem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 55, 72 (2014). Note that the study is
quite limited in scope and qualifies this estimate.
20. See Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at
A23, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/26/opinion/26marquis.html [http://perma.cc/KU4P-
G9XW.
21. 548 U.S. 163, 198-99 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Joshua Marquis, The
Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 518 (2005), and stating that the
possibility that a defendant will be wrongfully convicted and punished "has been reduced
to an insignificant minimum").
22. See D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778-79 (2007).
23. See Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 65,
71 (2008) (suggesting that Risinger's own data results in an error rate closer to 0.84%).
24. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon-
eration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={faf6eddb-5a68-4f8f-8a52-
2c6lf5bf9ea7}&SortField=Exonerated&SortDir=Asc [http://perma.cc/88WV-UJS2]. The
National Registry of Exonerations states that, as of November 24, 2015, there had been
1,705 exonerations. It further provides that:
A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and later
was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or
agency with the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the
consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body
with the authority to take that action. The official action may be: (i) a com-
plete pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the
pardon is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges
factually related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted;
or (iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the person was
originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter
that dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result,
at least in part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at
the trial at which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty,
was not known to the defendant, the defense attorney and the court at the
time the plea was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit
basis for the official action that exonerated the person.
Glossary, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/speciallexonera-
tion/Pages/glossary.aspx [http://perma.cc/ZF'7-9TNJ]. In one sense, a large number of ex-
onerations is a positive sign: at least some wrongful convictions are being corrected.
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million people currently incarcerated in the United States. 25 This percent-
age likely underestimates the rate of wrongful conviction, though, be-
cause a good proportion of those inmates were convicted prior to serious
tracking of wrongful conviction. Further, 83% of exonerations have been
for rape and homicide convictions, which account for only 2% of felony
convictions. 26 When isolating the rate of exonerations for rape and homi-
cide, the exoneration rate jumps to nearly 3%.27 There are still uncertain-
ties with this calculus. For example, would the rate of exonerations be
constant among different types of offenses? And, although exonerations
have been reported from all over the country, more than half of the exon-
erations in 2013 were from just six states.28 Even considering varying in-
carceration rates among the states, such a great disparity in the number of
exonerations among states seems unlikely. Further, it has been suggested
that we may not be aware of all exonerations that have taken place be-
cause individual counties may not be widely reporting them.29 Addition-
ally, although capital cases make up only a small percentage of felony
cases, they constitute a relatively high percentage of reported
exonerations. 30
Despite the variability in estimates on the rate of wrongful conviction
and lack of certainty as to the true number of exonerations, no one seems
to be arguing that no wrongful convictions have occurred or that no
wrongful convictions are continuing to occur. Instead, those who are less
concerned with the problem of wrongful conviction rightly suggest that a
perfect system is impossible. Indeed, even our accepted burden of
proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-contemplates that there can be no
absolute certainty that an individual is guilty. Even at the low end of the
estimates, though, there is reason to be concerned about individuals who
have been wrongfully convicted. People's lives and liberties are at stake.
As one law professor has suggested, it may be helpful to consider these
possible rates of wrongful conviction-even the lowest of them-in com-
parison to plane crashes: "Roughly 18,000 flights arrive or depart At-
lanta's Hartsfield-Jackson airport each week. If five of those planes
crashed-roughly .027% of flights-operations at the airport would cease
immediately. So, too, would 125 people wrongfully imprisoned annually
(.027% of all state court felony convictions) represent a disturbing num-
25. See J.F., America's Prison Population: Who, What, Where and Why?, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 13, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/03/americas-
prison-population [http://perma.cc/ZK88-878M]; Peter Wagner & Leah Sakala, Mass Incar-
ceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.prisonpolicy
.org/reports/pie.html [http://perma.cc/PV6J-BE7Z]; Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP,
http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [http://perma.cc/EPW8-6BGJ].
26. See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 3.
27. If about 83% of 1,705 exonerations are for rape and homicide, and if approxi-
mately 2% of the prison population (2.4 million) is incarcerated for rape or homicide, then
the exoneration rate for these crimes is about 3%.
28. See EXONERATIONS lN 2013, supra note 14, at 1.
29. See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 38.
30. See id. at 4.
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ber of wrongful convictions. ' '31
Considering that wrongful conviction is a serious concern, it is impor-
tant to isolate some of the major contributors to the problem. Part II of
this Article lays out these potential sources of error, including the
problems associated with faulty forensic evidence, eyewitness testimony,
false confessions, prosecutorial team actions, inadequate defense counsel,
informant testimony, and explicit and implicit bias. There is evidence that
many of these tools used to convict defendants are based on faulty scien-
tific footings and that actors within the criminal justice system can be
either consciously or unconsciously responsible for contributing to
wrongful convictions. 32 Many of these sources of error, though, can be
ameliorated through greater awareness of the problem, the use of more
rigorous procedures, and additional scientific research.
Although there is a need to address the sources of error within the
system, it is also important to recognize the ways in which judges are
limited in reviewing these cases. At the trial court level, judges are con-
strained by a limited understanding of the shortcomings of modern con-
viction tools. To the extent that trial court judges do possess the relevant
knowledge and capabilities for addressing the problem of wrongful con-
viction, this attacks only part of the problem. Today, it is likely that there
are innocent individuals serving time in prisons throughout the country. 33
Having already been convicted, they are unlikely to benefit as much from
remedies targeted at sources of error as those who have not yet been
tried. Appellate judges and perhaps the limited remedy of clemency may
be their only hope. Part III of this Article explores how appellate judges'
abilities to address this problem are generally quite limited under the cur-
rent system.
Despite the concerns raised in Parts II and III, Part IV highlights how
there have been several steps in the right direction toward addressing the
concerns related to wrongful conviction. Many actors within the criminal
justice system have learned about some of the shortcomings of currently
employed forensic methods, eyewitness testimony, and defendant confes-
sions. Moreover, cautionary tales about overzealous policing and prose-
cution, ineffective assistance of counsel, and explicit and implicit bias
have received some attention. 34 Further, some jurisdictions have either
legislatively or judicially implemented some new procedures aimed at the
31. Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L.
REV. 139, 143-44 (2012).
32. See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 63.
33. See id. at 3.
34. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-
01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-swartz [http://perma.cc/DC4W-8DF5]; Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The 'West Memphis Three' and





potential sources of wrongful conviction. 35 And many attorneys have got-
ten involved in helping individuals who have already been convicted but
yet persuasively declare their innocence.36
Although some steps have been made in the right direction, there is
still room for improvement. Part IV explains that education is essential to
addressing the problem of wrongful conviction. Judges and other relevant
decisionmakers must first understand and acknowledge that there truly is
a problem of wrongful conviction in this country. They must also feel em-
powered to address it-by embracing their authority within the system
and grasping onto the confidence and skill necessary to understand the
science behind much of the research related to wrongful conviction.
There also must be more research on the reliability of the tools used to
convict criminal defendants so that judges and others have the relevant
data to assess these tools' reliability for legal purposes. It is also impor-
tant that judges and others recognize that nearly all decisionmakers run
the risk of being colored by explicit and implicit biases. As with the prob-
lem of wrongful conviction itself, recognizing the potential for error and
imperfection is essential before one can begin to address the problem.
Both thorough education and the proper outlook are paramount in effec-
tively addressing the concern of wrongful conviction.
II. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ERROR
There are several factors that lead to wrongful convictions. 37 One ma-
jor possible source of error arises from the field of forensic science. 38 Fo-
rensic scientists have long relied on, and testified to, certain methods of
determining matters relevant to conviction.39 Some of these methods,
though, are not based on reliable science.40 Other possible sources of er-
ror include unreliable eyewitness testimony and defendants' false confes-
sions.41 Additionally, error can stem from either intentional or
unintentional conduct by prosecutors and law enforcement, or from inad-
equate representation by defense attorneys.42 Information and testimony
obtained from informants, who are frequently rewarded with "fees," such
as reduced sentences, are another source of error that can lead to wrong-
ful conviction.4 3 Further, explicit and implicit biases can contribute to
such wrong results.44 There are other numerous possible sources of error
35. See, e.g., Blasdell v. State, 384 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
36. See infra Part III.F.
37. Several sources of error have been identified, but we cannot list all known sources
of error, and an exhaustive list of such sources of error is not possible at this time. See
GRoss & SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 40.
38. Id. at 63.
39. See id. at 65.
40. See id. at 63.
41. Id. at 43, 57.
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id. at 54-55.
44. Id. at 49.
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that can lead to wrongful convictions, 45 and it is important to recognize
this wide range of potential defects that could lead to wrongful conviction
in order to better address this broad concern of innocent individuals be-
ing punished for crimes that they did not commit.
A. FAULTY FORENSIC EVIDENCE
False or misleading forensic evidence has been a major contributor to
the known cases of wrongful conviction.46 A 2009 study by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) examined
the uses of forensic science in criminal cases and found systemic problems
with many current forensic science practices. 47 An overarching difficulty
with forensic science is identifying what really is "science" and thus per-
haps more reliable than other evidence, and how this should be conveyed
in expert testimony. Specific problems include a lack of standards and
accreditation for forensic scientists and shaky scientific bases for and
methodologies employed in analyzing hair and fibers, tool-mark and fire-
arm impressions, fingerprints, arson indicators, symptoms of shaken baby
syndrome, and other types of forensic science.48 The problems with the
methodologies and standards employed in these areas are especially strik-
ing when compared to the methodologies and standards employed in the
context of DNA analysis, which the NAS designated as the "gold stan-
dard" for forensic science. 49 And the problems with other areas of foren-
sic science are exacerbated by generally poor scientific understanding
within the legal community, which has led many to ascribe undue value to
dubious evidence. 50
45. Not only is this list of possible sources of error not exclusive, but numerous sources
of error can coalesce to cause a wrongful conviction, such as may be seen in cases alleged
to involve child sexual abuse. See, e.g., Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2000),
on reh'g en banc sub nom. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting
forth the facts of a case that the Ninth Circuit explained arose "out of the investigation and
prosecution . . . for alleged sexual abuse of foster children . . . an investigation that
mushroomed into a sexual abuse 'witch hunt' in which 43 adults were charged with over
29,000 counts of sexual molestation").
46. See EXONERATIONS IN 2013, supra note 14, at 17.
47. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD xix (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE] (explaining that "change and advancements, both systemic and scien-
tific, are needed in a number of forensic science disciplines-to ensure the reliability of the
disciplines, establish enforceable standards, and promote best practices and their consistent
application"). Some of these problems are grounded in the lack of scientific research to
support the various forensic science disciplines' approaches, and some of these problems
are grounded in the lack of standardization and accreditation. See generally id.
48. See generally id.
49. DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE: CAN THE LAW KEEP UP
WITH SCIENCE? 190 (2012); see STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 130.
50. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 53, 85, 234 (explaining
that "the forensic science system exhibits serious shortcomings in capacity and quality; yet
the courts continue to rely on forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing
the limitations of different forensic science disciplines"); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at
Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L.
REV. 893, 896-97 (2008) (suggesting that lawyers are incapable of raising adequate chal-
lenges to dubious forensic evidence and that judges, lawyers, and juries are limited in their
1080 [Vol. 68
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The NAS report provides thirteen recommendations to improve the vi-
ability of forensic science for legal purposes. 51 These recommendations
generally entail standardization, quality assurance, and programs de-
signed to improve the reliability of results.52 Chief among these recom-
mendations is implementing standards and best practices, which currently
vary drastically among states and even within individual laboratories. 53
Basic terms like "match," "identical," and "consistent with" are used un-
systematically in testimony by forensic scientists and these terms require
standardization so that they can have meaning in a legal context.54 The
report also suggests that best practices can be accomplished only by
decoupling the administration of forensic science from law enforcement
so that reliance on conviction-driven forensic analysis can be replaced
with scientific objectivity.55 The report further recommends that labora-
tories receive accreditation to increase uniformity and ensure that labora-
tory reports include all necessary and relevant information.5 6 Similarly, to
improve quality control, the report recommends requiring that all foren-
sic science practitioners be certified.57 Further, it recommends greater co-
operation with other organizations, particularly with academic
institutions, so that forensic science can benefit from scientific advance-
ments and peer review processes.58 This last recommendation touches on
the relevance of scientific advancements to the reliability of forensic
science.
Faulty, unscientific methods can masquerade as reliable science and
thus contribute to wrongful convictions.59 Further scientific research and
more rigorous methodologies and standardization are important to ensur-
ing that the evidentiary bases of convictions are sound. Moreover, judges
and attorneys should be made aware of the shortcomings of the forensic
sciences. In many jurisdictions, judges-who are usually not trained in
science-are tasked as gatekeepers to determine whether proffered fo-
abilities "to understand and evaluate the sciences"); Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian Holm-
gren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There Is No Abusive Head Trauma!
Shaken Baby Syndrome "Scientific" Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2013)
("[Jiudges, law professors, and lawyers are not (as a general rule) scientists."); Major Eliz-
abeth A. Walker, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Daubert and MRE 702's Failure to Exclude
Unreliable Scientific Evidence and the Need for Reform, 210 MI. L. REV. 1, 47 (2011) ("It
is understandable that lawyers and judges would accept scientific expert testimony at face
value since the experts are much more knowledgeable in the area. An expert's credentials
and training alone can cause a judge to accept the expert's testimony as reliable without
question."). Generally poor scientific understanding within the legal community includes a
lack of understanding about basic scientific concepts, as well as reliance on myths that are
not rooted in scientific reasoning and research.
51. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 19-33.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 19-24.
54. See id. at 21.
55. See id. at 23-24.
56. See id. at 25.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 19-22, 110.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 65-114.
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rensic evidence is reliable. 60 And if judges, as well as lawyers, have diffi-
culty understanding the foundations of the various forensic science
disciplines, they may have difficulty deciding, or arguing, the related ad-
missibility questions. Studies have demonstrated that many judges are not
sensitive to the quality of science presented and do not fully understand
the questions implicit in determining scientific reliability under Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 61 Similarly, many attorneys lack suf-
ficient scientific knowledge to effectively challenge forensic evidence or
communicate to the judge or jury deficiencies in this evidence. 62 Even in
the context of the "gold standard" of DNA evidence, attorneys routinely
err in their presentation of matters such as the probability that the un-
known evidentiary sample was derived from the defendant. 63 These con-
cerns about the deficiencies of the forensic sciences, and judges' and
lawyers' limited understandings of the disciplines, have been discussed in
significant depth.64 Still, there remains a lack of scientific research to fully
support much of the forensic testimony that continues to be relied upon
in convicting defendants, thus contributing to the problem of wrongful
conviction.
1. DNA Analysis
While other forensic sciences were born from comparatively crude ob-
servations, DNA analysis spawned from cutting-edge biochemical sci-
ences. Accordingly, there is significant scientific support for this "gold
standard" of forensic evidence. 65 In contrast to other forensic sciences,
DNA analysis experts employ standardized methodologies and utilize sci-
entifically ascertained statistics on the prevalence of the DNA combina-
tions found in the analyses.66 This allows DNA analysis experts to testify
60. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); SHELTON, supra
note 49, at 13. Although this gatekeeper role of judges is often associated with Daubertjurisprudence, one scholar has explained that, "[a]lthough states differ as to the implemen-
tation of th[e] role, all have adopted the gatekeeper concept." SHELTON, supra note 49, at
13.
61. 509 U.S. 579; see, e.g., Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A Na-
tional Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 433, 444-47 (2001) (finding that a small minority of responding judges
demonstrated a clear understanding of "falsifiability" (6%) and "error rate" (4%)); Mar-
garet B. Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality
on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574, 580 (2000) (finding that the judges surveyed were generally unable
to distinguish between internally valid studies and confounded, missing-control-group, and
non-blinded studies).
62. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, passim.
63. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 85 (1998) ("Statistical errors routinely are com-
mitted even by defense attorneys, suggesting that lawyers as well as judges could benefit
from increased training in probability theory.").
64. See, e.g., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, passim (discussing
the shortcomings of many forensic science disciplines and the legal community's lack of
scientific understanding).




as to the probability that the discovered DNA comes from the individual
in question, rather than testifying-without the very relevant probabili-
ties-that there is, or is not, a match.
Errors can still occur with respect to DNA evidence, however. For ex-
ample, laboratory tests can be mislabeled or contaminated, 67 and an ana-
lyst could make a mistake or even possibly fabricate results. 68 Even
beyond technician error or fabrication, a DNA match could result from
something other than the individual in question having committed the
crime.69 Uncertainty still exists, then, even with the well-respected sci-
ence of DNA analysis. This forensic science is generally so reliable,
though, that it has been employed to obtain many of the exonerations
that have taken place within the last couple of decades. 70
2. Hair and Fiber Evidence
Hair and fiber analysis is an area that has become prey to a lack of
nuanced understanding and expert testimony. Hair analysis is viewed as a
useful forensic science because humans and animals frequently transfer
hairs to and from their surroundings. 71 All hairs have identifiable charac-
teristics, which can narrow the number of possible donors.72 The number
of possible donors can be narrowed only so far, however; testimony indi-
cating that hairs "match"-which is the testimony that experts in this area
sometimes espouse-can only really mean that the hairs exhibit the same
characteristics found within a group of people. 73 The forensic methods
employed in this area do not allow for a one-to-one match to be reliably
pronounced. 74 There are "[n]o scientifically accepted statistics about the
frequency with which particular characteristics of hair are distributed in
the population, '75 and therefore for every "match" there could be five
other people in the room whose hairs similarly "match. '76 Moreover,
67. See STRENGTHENING FOaNSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 45.
68. There are several known instances of laboratory technicians falsifying results. See
Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1495-1506 (2007). One such instance is described in the Texas
case of Ex Parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). It was discovered that the
technician on the case had engaged in "dry labbing"-testifying to results on tests that he
had never even run. See id. at 598-99. As a result, all of the technician's previous work
came under scrutiny, and the nearly 5,000 cases in which he had acted as a technician in the
previous six years at the laboratory had to be investigated. See id. An early sampling of the
cases he worked on exhibited an error rate of about 2%. See id. at 599.
69. See Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
261, 274 n.89 (2012) ("[W]hile DNA evidence can be 'uniquely probative' of a defendant's
innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant may not have left behind any of
his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could belong to his partner or an inno-
cent individual." (internal citations omitted)).
70. The first DNA exoneration was in 1989. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Inno-
cence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 59 (2008).
71. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 155-56.
72. See id. at 156.
73. See id. at 156-61.
74. See id. at 159-60.




there are not even uniform standards among forensic scientists as to how
many characteristics the sample and comparison hairs must have in com-
mon before a "match" is declared. 77 These deficiencies can lead to prob-
lematic expert testimony in cases. An especially stark example is the
recent revelation that FBI forensic experts gave flawed testimony in over
95% of re-examined cases in which the experts provided hair analysis
testimony. 78 This certainly calls into question the reliability of hair analy-
sis testimony regularly employed in criminal cases.
Forensic analysis of fibers is more scientifically validated but is subject
to similar constraints. 79 Fibers can be matched to a type of material, and
the field of matches can be narrowed because fibers retain characteristics
from the environments to which they are exposed.80 These environmental
changes have not, however, been sufficiently studied to fully individuate a
fiber.81
Nonetheless, hair and fiber evidence is sometimes admitted at trial and
presented by experts as if it were conclusive. 82 And it can often be diffi-
cult for judges to distinguish between careful, scrupulous expert testi-
mony in these areas, which may be properly admissible, and exaggerated
expert testimony. 83
3. Tool-Mark and Firearm Impressions
Another area in which more nuanced testimony and analysis is neces-
sary is that of tool-mark and firearm impressions. As with hair and fiber
evidence, there are problems with individuating these impressions.84
Whenever a harder metal strikes a softer metal, it leaves an impression
showing the characteristics of the harder metal.85 A common example is
the marks a gun barrel leaves on a bullet.86 There is little doubt that these
impressions can be used to identify a class of tool, but there is insufficient
empirical evidence to support individuation, i.e., to identify the particular
tool that made the mark. 87 The theory for individuation is that the manu-
facturing instruments creating tools like crowbars and bullets, themselves,
experience wear and tear, which affects the tool. Thus these manufac-
tured tools "will bear microscopically different marks," which then lead
77. See id. at 161.
78. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 2015.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 163.
82. See Findley, supra note 50, at 943 ("When a scientist from the crime laboratory
takes the stand to testify that ... hairs, or other such evidence from the crime scene can be
matched in the laboratory to the defendant, even-as such experts sometimes claim-to
the exclusion of all other persons in the world, that testimony is likely to be accepted as
conclusive.").
83. See id. at 945.
84. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 154.
85. See id. at 150.
86. See id. at 151.
87. See id. at 150-55.
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to critique tool marks.88 Forensic experts often testify that there is "suffi-
cient agreement" between impressions and that one impression is "con-
sistent with" another, but these terms are not adequately defined. 89 A
"significant amount of research would be needed to scientifically deter-
mine the degree to which firearms-related tool-marks are unique or even
to quantitatively characterize the probability of uniqueness." 90 Yet, ex-
pert opinions often present consistency between the tool and impression
as determinative fact, even though science cannot support this position.91
Although these expert opinions may be useful evidence in cases, experts
should use more precise language, and careful research should be con-
ducted to determine the probabilities of the uniqueness of tool-mark and
firearm impressions.
4. Fingerprint Evidence
Some of the same problems pervade the area of fingerprint evidence.
92
It may come as a surprise to many in the criminal justice field that finger-
print evidence may not be as scientifically reliable as commonly thought.
Although fingerprint evidence has been accepted for over a hundred
years and courts have readily embraced the proposition that fingerprint
evidence can uniquely identify an individual, this individuation has not
been scientifically established.93 Moreover, there is no consensus as to
how many characteristics the latent and known prints must share before a
match should be declared. 94 Still, the longstanding general acceptance of
fingerprint evidence has kept it from being successfully challenged in the
vast majority of cases.95 Some courts have even held that it is unnecessary
to hold admissibility hearings on fingerprint evidence. 96 And once finger-
88. See id.
89. Id. at 153, 155. "Agreement" is sufficient when "the likelihood another tool could
have made the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical impossibility." Theory of
Identification as it Relates to Toolmarks, 30 AFTE J. 86, 89 (1998).
90. Id. at 154.
91. See id. at 154-55; see also United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-09 (D.
Mass. 2005) (allowing an expert's testimony regarding similarity between the casings found
at the scene and the test casings fired from the pistol in question, but refusing to allow the
expert to testify that the casings had come from the pistol at issue "to the exclusion of
every other firearm in the world"); Susan D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal De-
fendants and the Short End of the Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 599-600 (2007)
(explaining that "[t]ool mark evidence, wherein an expert testifies that the particular
marks left by a harder object's impression on a softer one identify the exact harder object
that left those marks" is controversial).
92. This "[a]nalysis of the images left by prints on the fingers, palms or soles is more
properly known as 'friction ridge analysis."' SHELTON, supra note 49, at 79.
93. See id.; STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 136, 142-45.
94. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 147.
95. See SHELTON, supra note 49, at 85-91.
96. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining
that, "in the context of fingerprint evidence, a Daubert hearing is not always required" and
that, "in most cases, absent novel challenges, fingerprint evidence is sufficiently reliable to
satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert" because it "has been tested in the adversarial system for
over a century," "the error rate is low," and it "has been routinely subject to peer review");
United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D. D.C. 2000) ("Although the Court must
ensure that expert testimony is reliable and admissible, there is nothing in Kumho Tire or
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print evidence is admitted, it is difficult to overcome due to the weight it
carries with juries.97 As with other types of forensic evidence, a signifi-
cant problem with fingerprint evidence is the way it is presented at trial-
again, as either a "match" or "not a match" (or sometimes as "inconclu-
sive"). 98 Moreover, the use of fingerprint evidence at trial begs for more
careful expert testimony. 99 These experts ought to refrain from testifying
only to a "match" or "no match" and, instead, temper their language to
more modest statements of what such a "match" really means statisti-
cally.100 Existing research does not disprove fingerprint evidence, but fur-
ther research is necessary to determine the extent to which an individual's
fingerprints are actually unique and whether latent and known prints can
be reliably matched by fingerprint examiners.10 '
5. Arson Science
A lack of scientific basis has also been discovered in some historically
employed methodologies in arson science. Analysis of the causes of fires
is typically conducted by people with field experience but without scien-
tific training.' 0 2 And such analyses have traditionally relied on arson in-
dicators such as "crazed glass" and "pour patterns" suggesting that an
accelerant had been applied to that area. 10 3 As researchers have studied
how fires actually burn, though, they have learned that many of these
regularly relied upon indicators of arson are unreliable and that there
Daubert that requires the Court to conduct a pre-trial evidentiary hearing if the expert
testimony [such as that regarding the reliability of fingerprint evidence] is based on well-
established principles."); see also SHELTON, supra note 49, at 79 ("Courts have accepted the
proposition that each person's fingerprint is unique and that fingerprint comparison is al-
most infallible as a means of forensic identification.").
97. See SHELTON, supra note 49, at 87 ("Most of the claims made by fingerprint exam-
iners enjoy widespread belief among members of both the public and the bar."); Simon A.
Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1028 (2005) ("[B]ecause fingerprint evidence is much more
persuasive, far better trusted, and presented to the jury in much stronger terms than micro-
scopic hair comparison or serology ever were, fingerprint errors are probably far more
likely to result in wrongful convictions and to go undetected if they do."); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2004,
at A14, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorialopinion/oped/articles/2004/02/02/a-
blow to the credibility.of__fingerprint evidence/ [http://perma.cc/UZ5H-V8UJ] ("Finger-
print evidence has enormous cultural power-in [one criminal defendant's] case, the prose-
cutor had said he was prepared to prosecute again, despite the exculpatory DNA findings,
precisely because of that supposed fingerprint match."). But cf. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 237 (suggesting that further research is necessary to better un-
derstand "[j]urors' use and comprehension of forensic evidence" and noting that "[j]uries
frequently raise concerns about laboratory error and sample contamination, even when
opposing counsel does not introduce such issues").
98. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confes-
sions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 139 (2008).
99. See id. at 139.
100. See SHELTON, supra note 49, at 84-87; Mnookin, supra note 98, at 139-40.
101. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 139-45; Mnookin, supra
note 98, at 140.
102. See SHELTON, supra note 49, at 137.
103. See Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, "Shifted Science" and Post-Conviction Relief,
8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 272-73 (2012).
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may be explanations other than arson for these characteristics to appear
in the wreckage of a fire.10 4 For example, a "flashover"' 0 5 could explain
the burn lines that were once thought to indicate the presence of an accel-
erant.10 6 And "crazed glass" is caused by the rapid cooling of heated
glass-such as could occur when the glass is struck by a mist of water
from a firefighter's hose. 10 7 Even after the National Fire Protection
Agency began to dispel these arson indicator myths in 1992, many arson
experts continued to cling to them, and officials have continued to use
them to obtain arson convictions.' 0 8
6. "Shaken Baby Syndrome"
The use of "shaken baby syndrome" diagnoses in criminal cases pro-
vides an example of how continuing research can shed light on earlier
scientific conclusions and the need to absorb such scientific advances into
the criminal justice system. Historically, shaken baby syndrome was diag-
nosed when the "classic triad" of symptoms presented: retinal hemor-
rhages, subdural hemorrhages, and cerebral edema. 10 9 Shaken baby
syndrome has frequently been used as evidence of child abuse, as it has
been thought to indicate that an infant has been violently shaken by his
caretaker." 0 Thousands of people have been convicted based on the "sci-
ence" of shaken baby syndrome."' As more research has been con-
ducted, though, perceptions have begun to change, and shaken baby
syndrome has been called into doubt. 112 Although some debate persists
in the medical community, the shift from the certainty of these diagnoses
to doubt about them has been sufficient to bring about some change in
the legal community. 113 Some courts have even considered the shift sig-
nificant enough to be considered sufficient new evidence to warrant a
new trial.114
104. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 267-68.
105. A "flashover" may occur if a fire is allowed to burn inside of a closed room for an
extended period of time. See Plummer & Syed, supra note 103, at 272. As the fire continues
to burn, the smoke it produces forms a layer, and the temperature in the room rises signifi-
cantly. See id. Once the temperature reaches about 1100'F, "the fire reaches a flashover
point, where any item near the layer of smoke could combust." Id. This "post-flashover
burning" can create burn patterns that, for years, arson experts thought indicated that ac-
celerant had been poured in the area. Id. A better understanding of this flashover effect
has "helped expose as false one of the main tools in the arsenal of fire investigators." Id.
106. See SHELTON, supra note 49, at 138; Plummer & Syed, supra note 103, at 272-73.
107. See John J. Lentini, Behavior of Glass at Elevated Temperatures, 37 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 1358, 1362 (1992).
108. See Plummer & Syed, supra note 103, at 273.
109. See id. at 267; Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby
Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009).
110. See Plummer & Syed, supra note 103, at 267.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 267-68.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 267-69; see, e.g., State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 598-99 (Wis. 2008)
(concluding that "a shift in mainstream medical opinion since the [defendant's] trial as to




Science has also given us new insight on the complicated nature of eye-
witness testimony. Once considered one of the most reliable forms of evi-
dence, it has become somewhat suspect. Still, the use of eyewitness
testimony can be incredibly damning at trial. For example, Calvin Willis,
a Louisiana man, wrongly served over twenty-one years in prison for al-
legedly raping a ten-year-old girl-a conviction that was largely based on
eyewitness testimony.115 The victim and her two friends identified Willis
as the perpetrator, although their accounts conflicted and changed as
time passed." 6 The victim's mother's account was similarly inconsistent
over time.117 Still, Willis was convicted of raping the child.'1 8 Later, DNA
samples from the victim's clothing excluded Willis as a DNA contributor,
and prosecutors refused to re-prosecute.11 9 The power of eyewitness testi-
mony as seen in this case necessitates a better understanding of the relia-
bility of this type of evidence.
Over time, we have learned more about human memory and therefore
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Memory is no longer conceptual-
ized as akin to playing back a video; rather, memory is a reconstructive
process in which individuals first deconstruct an event through filtered
perceptions, then selectively store memories, and finally recall and recon-
struct only a fraction of those memories. 20 Each of these three phases is
critical to what a person remembers, and each phase has vulnerabilities,
all of which contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.' 2 '
Perception is influenced by both the identity of the witness and the
event the witness perceives. 22 Witness characteristics that may affect reli-
ability include the witness's age, gender, drug consumption, and fear
level. 123 Event factors may also affect reliability of the eyewitness. For
example, trauma and stress tend to limit individuals' perceptions. 24 Al-
though people sometimes assume traumatic experiences will be burned
into their memories, it is more common that a traumatized victim, like
the child in the Willis case, would be too overwhelmed to accurately re-
mate and significant dispute within the medical community as to the cause of those inju-
ries . . . constitutes newly discovered evidence" justifying a new trial).






120. See PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS § 12:2, at
756-58 (2013).
121. See id.
122. See ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS ET AL., EYEwITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 2-3, at 16 (5th ed. 2013).
123. See id. § 2-8, at 28, § 2-15[b], at 46.
124. See id. §§ 2-8-9, at 765-66; PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENT'TC EVIDENCE IN CRIMI-
NAL TRIALS, supra note 120, §§ 12:9-10. Stress and fear are also categorized as witness
factors. See Loirus ET AL., supra note 122, §§ 2-8-9, at 28.
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member any details about the perpetrator. 125 Relatedly, the involvement
of weapons in a crime generally diminishes the reliability of a witness's
memories about the event. 126 Witnesses also often have difficulty making
cross-racial identifications, ordinarily making witness testimony in such
circumstances less reliable.'2 7
Beyond difficulties with perception, memories are also affected while
they are stored.1 28 New information may be conflated with old memories,
and memories may flex to accommodate new conflicting information. 129
Memories also adapt to become consistent with what people believe.' 30
Accordingly, a witness's testimony might change as he learns new facts.' 3 '
This may not necessarily be an active process of consciously changing
one's story but instead may be an actual shift in what that person remem-
bers.' 32 Relatedly, individuals' memories are better in the short-term; de-
tails are forgotten over time.133 Therefore, skepticism of eyewitness
testimony should be heightened in cases like Willis's-when a witness be-
gins to remember further details as time passes-because later-recalled
details are unlikely to accurately reflect memories of the event.1 34
Finally, memory recall can be undependable.1 35 Recall may be affected
by factors such as the identity of the questioner and the way in which the
witness is questioned.1 36 For example, whether the questioner is a "mere
passerby" or a person of higher status can affect a witness's answer.137
And open-ended questions tend to "yield more accurate, but less com-
plete," answers than leading questions. 138 Suggestive interrogation can al-
ter a witness's memory and is considered particularly dangerous in cases
like those involving rape if there is no supporting physical evidence.139
Also, as may be expected, children have been shown to be highly suggest-
ible and can be easily influenced simply through leading questions or au-
thoritative questioners, 140 which may also have contributed to the
125. See PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note
120, § 12:9, at 765.
126. See Lovrus ET AL., supra note 122, § 2-10, at 32-33; PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note 120, § 12:9, at 765. This is known as
"weapon focus." Lovrus ET AL., supra note 122, § 2-10, at 32-33 (emphasis omitted).
127. See Lovrus ET AL., supra note 122, § 4-13, at 100-01.
128. See PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, supra note
120, § 12:11, at 766-67.




133. See id. § 12:13, at 768.
134. See id.




139. See id. § 12:15-16, at 769, 772.
140. See LucY S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 65-76 (1994); cf JON'A F. MEYER, INACCURACIES IN CHILDREN'S TESTI-
MONY: MEMORY, SUGGESTIBILITY, OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY? 39 (1997) (suggesting
that young children may not be much more suggestible than adults or older children but
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unreliable testimony at issue in the Willis case.
All of these vulnerabilities of the perception, storage, and recall of
memories pose difficulties for eyewitness identifications and testimonies.
Improving the procedures used to elicit and employ these memories in
the criminal justice system is an important piece of heightening the relia-
bility of this evidence. For example, mug shot searches can sometimes
cause retroactive interference by weakening a person's memory of the
actual perpetrator. 141 If an eyewitness vaguely remembers a suspect or a
few of his characteristics but is then exposed to dozens, or hundreds, of
photographs, the eyewitness's memories may become diluted. 142 This or-
dinarily occurs only when the witness is presented with the mug shot
again in a different context.' 43 Moreover, mug shot searches can cause
transference so that a person may seem to recall a face later, as in a
lineup, when the person may actually be remembering that face from the
mug shot search;144 the witness may not recall the suspect when reviewing
mug shots, but he may identify that suspect in the lineup because his
memory of the suspect's mug shot transferred to his identification in the
lineup.1 45 Mug shot searches also raise issues of "commitment"-once a
witness selects a suspect, he is unlikely to deviate from that choice later,
even if it is erroneous. 146
Another example of the effect of procedures on identification results is
seen with the composition and administration of lineups. The individuals
chosen to stand alongside a suspect in a lineup ("fillers") are important
because a suspect may blend in or stand out; choosing fillers who match a
pre-established description provided by the witness can reduce error
rates. 147 In contrast, a poorly constructed lineup could allow even a non-
witness to select the main suspect from the group by merely reading the
witness's description. 148 Also, lineup instructions can bias identifications
through improper suggestion.' 49 In fact, such instructions can be so per-
suasive as to more than double a false identification rate.' 50 Relatedly,
police observation of lineups can distort eyewitness identifications if an
officer either consciously or unconsciously provides subtle clues to the
witness or confirms the witness's selection, which could influence the wit-
ness's confidence level during his later testimony.' 51 Even employing
traditional lineups rather than sequential ones can affect results because a
witness choosing from a set group might presume the suspect is within the
that, "[w]hen asked leading questions about minor details.... adults were significantly less
suggestible than [children]").
141. See LoFrus ET AL., supra note 122, § 4-6, at 85.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 85-86.
144. See id. at 86.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. § 4-8[b], at 90.
148. See id.
149. See id. § 4-9, at 91.
150. See id.
151. See id. § 4-10, at 92.
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group and make a relativistic determination to select the possible of-
fender. 152 In contrast, if a lineup is conducted sequentially-one potential
suspect at a time-this additional possible source of error can be
reduced. 153
C. FALSE CONFESSIONS
False confessions are a further source of potential error leading to
wrongful convictions. Many people question why an innocent person
would falsely confess, and there is a persistent myth that, in the absence
of the extreme, physical, brutish interrogation tactics of decades past,
people will not confess to crimes they have not committed. 154 This myth
is particularly pervasive in the law enforcement community.1 55 The unfor-
tunate truth, however, is that modem psychological interrogation tech-
niques continue to produce false confessions. 156 Indeed, false confessions
are responsible for about 12% of known wrongful convictions. 157
Perhaps contrary to one's initial impression, not only weak and intel-
lectually disabled persons falsely confess, but, when interrogated, ordi-
nary people also confess to serious crimes that they did not commit. 158
For example, Christopher Ochoa and Richard Danzinger both served
nearly twelve years in prison for crimes neither of them committed after
Ochoa succumbed to police pressure, confessing and implicating Danz-
inger.159 Police officers had noticed that these suspects, who worked in
the same restaurant as the victim, seemed to know details of the crime
kept from the public. 160 On the advice of counsel, Ochoa accepted a plea
bargain-receiving a life sentence in exchange for pleading guilty and tes-
tifying against Danzinger-when he was threatened with the death pen-
alty.' 6 ' Nearly twelve years later, though, another man confessed and
came forward with details of the crime.' 62 Additionally, sperm recovered
from the crime scene was retested, and it excluded both Ochoa and Danz-
inger.163 Ochoa and Danzinger were then exonerated.164
152. See id. § 4-8[a], at 88-89.
153. See id.
154. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 196
(2008).
155. See id. at 197.
156. See id. at 196-97; supra text accompanying note 14.
157. See EXONERATIONS IN 2013, supra note 14, at 17.
158. See Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36 (Saundra D. Westervelt &
John A. Humphrey eds., 2001). One study found that fifteen out of sixty-two wrongful
convictions resulted from false confessions. See id.
159. See Christopher Ochoa, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/









As demonstrated in the Ochoa case, police officers may attempt to
make a suspect's immediate situation seem graver than it is; they may try
to make a suspect think that he has fewer options than he really does, and
police officers may also exaggerate the consequences of these options.165
Police officers are trained to instill a sense of hopelessness in the suspect
and then offer him inducements to confess. 166 And interrogators are
given broad leeway to accomplish this; they are allowed to exaggerate
evidence or even lie.167 Suspects are often presented with seemingly irref-
utable proof of their guilt and convinced that they have no choice but to
confess.168 Once a suspect is sufficiently hopeless, interrogators begin to
offer a way out; suspects are persuaded that maintaining their innocence
will cost them more than confessing. 169 Various suspects require different
levels of inducement to elicit a false confession. 170 Interrogators may sim-
ply suggest that confession will alleviate a suspect's conscience, or that
family and friends will view the suspect as a better person for confess-
ing.171 Interrogators also might feign sympathy or attempt to downplay
the crime as an accident or self-defense. 172 Or, interrogators might sug-
gest that, if the suspect does not confess, he will be treated less sympa-
thetically-that the interrogator and the prosecutor may be more hostile
or aggressive. 173 Interrogators might also suggest that the suspect will re-
ceive a reduced sentence or other forms of leniency if he confesses. 174
The pressures of interrogation contribute to false confessions for vari-
ous reasons. So-called "stress-compliant" confessions occur when a sus-
pect can no longer tolerate an interrogation and tries to escape by saying
whatever he believes the interrogator wants to hear. 75 A "coerced-per-
suaded" confession occurs when a suspect begins to doubt his own mem-
ory and ultimately concludes that, based on the evidence presented, he
must have committed the crime.176 Individuals might also confess for the
purpose of gaining notoriety, as with the hundreds of false confessions in
the infamous Black Dahlia case, or as a result of a mental disorder.' 77
165. See Leo, supra note 158, at 38.
166. See id. at 38-39.




171. See id. at 39-40.
172. See id. at 41.
173. See id. at 40.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 42.
176. See id. at 43.
177. See id. at 42; see also Confessions Don't Mean Crime Has Been Solved, NBCNEws
.COM (Aug. 19, 2006), http:/lwww.nbcnews.comid/14416492/nsus-news-crime-and-courts/
t/confessions-dont-mean-crime-has-been-solved/#.U9VMKO0g9dg [http://perma.cc/S2Z2-
B88P] ("More than 200 people confessed to the 1932 kidnapping and murder of Charles
Lindbergh's infant son. The 1947 'Black Dahlia' murder-the slaying of aspiring actress
Elizabeth Short, who was found naked and sliced in half in a vacant Los Angeles lot-
attracted numerous spurious confessions."). Individuals might voluntarily confess-even in
the absence of police questioning-for a variety of reasons: a morbid desire for notoriety,
the need to expiate guilt about imagined as well as real acts, the need to receive attention
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Foremost among the solutions to the problem of false confessions is
promoting awareness of the problem. Police officers are under significant
pressure to quickly and efficiently solve crimes, and they should not be
overly handicapped in doing so. At the same time, an examination of
interrogation techniques in light of the science of false confessions could
prove useful. Training officers about the possibility and sources of false
confessions could also reduce the number of false confessions leading to
wrongful convictions. Judges and lawyers, too, should be aware that con-
fessions are not necessarily conclusive of guilt.
D. PROSECUTORIAL TEAM ACTIONS
The preceding issues are not the only reasons that innocent people may
be wrongfully convicted. In some circumstances, government actors may
directly contribute to wrongful convictions. Although dedicated police of-
ficers and prosecutors are important to the maintenance of public safety,
there are instances in which these actors may go too far. Many of these
instances may result from guileless conduct, but it may still be harmful. In
some cases, though, police officers and prosecutors cross the line and en-
gage in professional misconduct. Some of this can perhaps be attributed
to the adversarial nature of our legal system, which sometimes encour-
ages government actors to push the limits of the law to secure
convictions.
Putting aside the cases in which government actors knowingly engage
in questionable conduct, some unintentional conduct by law enforcement
also contributes to wrongful convictions.178 For example, law enforce-
ment officials sometimes-perhaps inadvertently-make improper sug-
gestions to witnesses, thereby influencing the identification of a
suspect.179 Given the sensitive nature of identifications and how easily
they can be influenced, unless strict protocols and training are in place, it
is difficult to avoid police influence in these procedures. 180 Although co-
ercing a confession would constitute professional misconduct, inducing a
confession is a standard interrogation technique, but the two approaches
are not always distinguishable. 181 Coercion tends to be a matter of de-
or fame, the desire to protect or assist the real offender, an inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, or a pathological need for acceptance or self-punishment." Leo, supra
note 158, at 42.
178. See Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongful Convictions, 2008 J. UTAH L. REV. 5,
20-21 (2008); Leo, supra note 158, at 37.
179. See Leo, supra note 158, at 38; Melissa B. Russano et al., "Why Don't You Take
Another Look at Number Three?": Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects on Eyewitness
Confidence and Identification Decisions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. POL'Y & ETHics J. 355, 358-59
(2006).
180. See generally LoFTuS ET AL., supra note 122, § 4 (explaining the difficulties of
eyewitness identifications and how improved procedures can improve the reliability of
these identifications).
181. See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43
DUKE L.J. 947, 952-53 (1994); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:




gree; forms of coercion, like depriving a suspect of food or sleep, might
be acceptable for hours but not days.182 Likewise, inducement may
amount to coercion if a suspect is not allowed to talk to family, friends, or
an attorney for an excessive period of time.183 While inducements are
generally part of the plea-bargaining process, some inducements-such as
paying a witness $10,000 for her testimony-likely cross over the line into
the area of misconduct, although it is effectively the same type of induce-
ment for testimony as a plea bargain.184 Similarly, while some stereotyp-
ing-like excluding an elderly person as a physical threat-constitutes
basic police work, other types-like racial profiling-are generally con-
sidered unacceptable. 185 But any time police officers exclude or include
suspects based on their own stereotypes, this method is fraught with
error.
186
Some types of prosecutorial misconduct can be difficult to identify be-
cause part of a prosecutor's job is to zealously advocate on behalf of the
182. See SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFES-
SIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE 41 (2002).
183. See id.
184. See AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUST. PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standards 3-3.2(a), 3-3.3(b) (1993) (stating that "[a] prose-
cutor should not compensate a witness, other than an expert, for giving testimony, but it is
not improper to reimburse an ordinary witness for the reasonable expenses of attendance
upon court, attendance for depositions pursuant to statute or court rule, or attendance for
pretrial interviews" and that "[a] prosecutor should not pay an excessive fee for the pur-
pose of influencing the expert's testimony or to fix the amount of the fee contingent upon
the testimony the expert will give or the result in the case").
185. See R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1201, 1211-12 (2004) (distinguishing between "racial profiling" and basic police work
like "question[ing] individuals who matched the description of the alleged wrongdoer");
Dianne L. Martin, The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions: An International Comparative
Study, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE, supra note 158, at 77,
89 ("Patrol work, in particular, is designed to identify who or what doesn't fit, whether it is
a black youth in a white neighborhood or some other shorthand picture of 'what should be
there.' Detective work, on the other hand, stereotypes familiarity and is frequently an exer-
cise in locating and processing 'typical' offenders who have committed the same crime
many times before." (internal citations omitted)); Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ
Lead the Way: Why DOJ's Pattern or Practice Authority Is the Most Effective Tool to Con-
trol Racial Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 311, 321 (2003) (explaining that the
purpose of profiling-or engaging in "appropriate investigative techniques"-"is to allow
police officers to pinpoint the same number of criminal offenders while detaining fewer
people," thereby decreasing the cost of obtaining necessary information, and distinguishing
this from "racial profiling"); Illegal Profiling Policy, POLICE OF ODESSA, http://www.odes-
sapd.com/index.aspx?page=52 [http://perma.cc/UE35-N5Q4] (prohibiting profiling based
on an individual's race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, religion, eco-
nomic status, or age); Internal Affairs Division, DALLAS POLICE DEP'T, http://www.dallas-
police.net/divisions/intemalaffairs/racialProfiling.html [http://perma.cc/V3EQ-62WF]
(explaining Texas's passage of a law prohibiting racial profiling). See also generally Dean
A. Dabney et al., The Impact of Implicit Stereotyping on Offender Profiling: Unexpected
Results from an Observational Study of Shoplifting, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 646 (2006),
http://www.ccjs.umd.edu/siteslccjs.umd.edulfileslpubsfProfiling-CJ-Behavior.pdf [http://
perma.cc/7K6M-LVRW] (examining the extent to which offender profiling is based on bi-
ases such as race and gender).
186. See Martin, supra note 185, at 89. See generally Dabney et al., supra note 185 (ex-
amining the extent to which offender profiling is based on biases such as race and gender).
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government.187 Delivering misleading arguments, for example, is a tactic
that could contribute to wrongful convictions. 188 Here, too, it may be dif-
ficult to know where the line should be drawn, as emphasizing specific
points and trying to narrow a jury's focus are part of the prosecutor's job.
Prosecutors also face questions about the extent to which they should rely
on forensic reports when the technician has somewhat of a reputation for
stretching his analyses to favor the prosecution. 189 This is one area in
which prosecutors have some power to limit the errors that may have
been created by unreliable forensic science.
One contributor to wrongful convictions is prosecutors' failure to dis-
close exculpatory evidence that is material to the defendant's guilt or
punishment. 190 Of course Brady v. Maryland'91 states that this is a consti-
tutional requirement, and legal ethics codes emphasize the importance of
this disclosure.192 There is often room for argument, though, as to
whether certain evidence is material or actually exculpatory. Further,
there is disagreement among lawyers as to whether only exculpatory evi-
dence that is material must be disclosed or, rather, whether all exculpa-
tory evidence should be disclosed but that there is only a constitutional
remedy when the evidence withheld was material to guilt or
punishment. 193
While there are gray areas with much of the work done by police of-
ficers and prosecutors, there are some practices that are clearly impermis-
sible but are nevertheless sometimes employed. For example, it certainly
constitutes misconduct when police officers lie to judges or jurors about
their observations or conduct, or lie to their own teams and fail to turn
over exculpatory evidence. 194 Other common types of misconduct by
187. Of course prosecutors are also charged with achieving justice. See, e.g., Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.");
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 184, at Standard 3-1.2(c) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to
seek justice, not merely to convict.").
188. See Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject
.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php [http://perma.cc/75YQ-69H7].
189. See Government Misconduct, supra note 188.
190. See Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convic-
tions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 854-55 (2010);
Government Misconduct, supra note 188. Of course prosecutors also have an obligation to
disclose certain impeachment evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150-55
(1972); R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (2011).
191. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
192. See id. at 86; see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.8 (2013) (stating
that a "prosecutor ... shall ... make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or miti-
gates the offense").
193. Cassidy, supra note 190, at 1432.
194. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90
WASH. U. L. REv. 1133, 1175-83 (2013); Government Misconduct, supra note 188; see also
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (stating that, "[s]ince... the prosecutor has the
means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he will, any argument for ex-
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prosecutors include the deliberate mishandling of evidence and pressur-
ing defense witnesses not to testify.195 Many of these problems may be
byproducts of our adversarial system in which police forces and prosecu-
tors face off against suspects and are pressured to solve and prosecute
crimes while saddled with limited resources. 196 And this is exacerbated by
the methods used to evaluate prosecutors' job performances, such as by
measuring their conviction rates.197
As with other potential sources of error contributing to wrongful con-
victions, awareness of the potential for harm is the first step in addressing
the problem. Beyond educating attorneys about these possible sources of
error and better training, greater oversight for prosecutors and alterna-
tive incentives for both prosecutors and police officers might aid in cor-
recting some of these problems.
E. INADEQUATE DEFENSE COUNSEL
Inadequate defense counsel is another issue to be concerned about in
the criminal justice system. With so many potential sources of wrongful
conviction, vigilant defense attorneys are vital to avoid wrongful convic-
tions. For example, knowledge and training are necessary to exclude, ob-
ject to, and preserve error relating to the admission and use of forensic
evidence. 198 A defense attorney should be able to challenge forensic sci-
ence and eyewitness identifications with expert testimony about the relia-
bility of these types of evidence. 199 A defense attorney should also be
engaged throughout a suspect's journey through the criminal justice sys-
tem to ensure lineups are conducted with appropriate safeguards, protect
against coercive interrogation techniques, and defend against overzealous
prosecution. 2°° Unfortunately, defense attorneys are not always this
vigilant.201
cusing a prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to know about boils down to
a plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the
final arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.").
195. See Government Misconduct, supra note 188.
196. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 192
B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 691 (1992) ("In the case of the prosecutor, the emphasis upon victory
inherent in an adversary ethic not only motivates potential misconduct, but also steers the
prosecutor inexorably toward a conviction psychology. As a result, the adversary process
makes it difficult for the prosecutor to protect the innocent.")
197. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-37 (2004).
198. See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This
Much Injustice?, 75 Mo. L. REV. 683, 691 (2010) (explaining that resources, independence,
training, and competent management are essential for public defenders to represent indi-
gent defendants to the level "that justice requires"); Michele Nethercott, Indigent Defense:
Faulty Forensic Evidence, 27 CHAMPION 61, 61 (2003) ("The burden of responding to the
ever-increasing use of complicated scientific evidence in the courtroom has been imposed
disproportionately on public defenders. Very few private attorneys or their clients have the
resources required to address the systemic issues presented by the misuse of complicated
scientific evidence.").





One example of inadequate defense counsel leading to a wrongful con-
viction can be found in the case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard. 20 2 The govern-
ment's rape case against Bromgard was penetrable; it consisted of: (1)
victim testimony that she was "not too sure" that Bromgard was the per-
petrator and (2) unsupported (and ultimately false) testimony that hair
found at the crime scene was "indistinguishable" from Bromgard's
hair.203 Although this second piece of evidence might seem damning, ef-
fective lawyering could have exposed the inaccuracy of this testimony.
20 4
Instead, Bromgard's lawyer did not present an opening statement or pre-
pare a closing one.20 5 Further, he did no independent investigation and
failed to hire an expert to contradict the State's flawed forensic evi-
dence.206 The attorney did not even file a motion to suppress the victim's
shaky identification. 20 7 And the attorney then failed to appeal Brom-
gard's conviction. 20 8 Bromgard spent over fourteen years in prison before
ultimately being exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.
20 9
Most criminal defendants are represented by publicly funded coun-
sel,210 and the limits on resources available for these attorneys likely con-
tribute to instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal
cases. 211 In the worst cases, defense counsel falls asleep at trial, fails to
appear for hearings, or is disbarred shortly after working on a case. 212 But
202. See Jimmy Ray Bromgard, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/JimmyRay-Bromgard.php [http://perma.cc/62DC-CSTX].
203. See State v. Bromgard, 862 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Mont. 1993) (stating that hair samples
"Bromgard agreed to submit.., were sent to the State Crime Laboratory and were found
to be indistinguishable from certain samples recovered from the victim's bedding"); Jimmy
Ray Bromgard, supra note 202; see also Garrett, supra note 70, at 84 ("In the case of Jimmy
Ray Bromgard, [the expert] used made-up probabilities that he then improperly multiplied
as follows: 'The odds were one in one hundred that two people would have head hair or
pubic hair so similar that they could not be distinguished by microscopic comparison and
the odds of both head and pubic hair from two people being indistinguishable would be
about one in ten thousand."' (internal alterations omitted)). A look at the resolution of
Bromgard's various legal proceedings suggests that there was additional evidence pointing
toward Bromgard's guilt. See, e.g., State v. Bromgard, 901 P.2d 611, 612 (Mont. 1995) (not-
ing that that the victim identified Bromgard in a lineup).
204. See Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic Evidence's Relia-
bility and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn't the Only Problem, 43
TULSA L. REV. 285, 306 (2007) (stating that the hair testimony, which "was the linchpin to
the prosecution's successful case," was never challenged by Bromgard's attorney at trial);
Jimmy Ray Bromgard, supra note 202.





210. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780, 815 (2006) ("About half of all criminal defendants were eligible for appointed
counsel in 1980; by 1992 the figure was 80%, and it is probably higher today."). In New
Orleans, Louisiana, for example, more than 80% of criminal defendants are represented by
public defenders. See Editorial Board, Federal Oversight on Public Defense, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/O9/08/opinionlsunday/federal-oversight-on-
public-defense.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/NQ6J-DR2S].
211. See Editorial Board, supra note 210.




the current state of affairs makes good criminal defense difficult for even
the best publicly funded lawyers. In some states, public defenders are
working over 1,700 cases each year, including over 200 felony cases. 213
With only a few hours to dedicate to each case, it is understandable that
these lawyers often adopt a transactional approach and for plea bargain-
ing to be the norm. Publicly funded defense attorneys also tend to be
poorly compensated. 214Although some states offer an hourly rate of ap-
proximately $90 per hour, there may be caps in particular cases, such as
the Virginia cap of $112 total for a juvenile felony case.215 Such poor
compensation disincentivizes attorneys from spending more time on each
case.216 It also tends to make recruitment and retention of experienced
attorneys difficult. 217
One manifestation of the inadequate resources indigent defendants
and their counsel receive is the abundance of "meet 'em and plead 'em"
lawyers. 218 One report found that more than 80% of indigent clients
never met their attorneys out of court and were given pre-negotiated plea
agreements when they finally met their attorneys at trial.21 9 And a study
of all felony cases in one county over a five-year period found that over
40% of cases were resolved by a guilty plea on the day of arraignment at
the same time clients first met their attorneys.220 Sadly, though, many
defendants are not even appointed counsel in time for their first appear-
ances. 221 Some jurisdictions admit to thousands of such unconstitutional
failures each year. 222
The compensation for publicly funded defense attorneys is also often
significantly less than the compensation for the district attorneys prose-
cuting the cases. 223 Because the prosecution often has greater resources,
it is not uncommon for there to be more, and better qualified, prosecu-
tors working on a particular case.224 Recognizing these problems and the
need for greater funding for indigent defense, former Attorney General
Janet Reno explained that this defense work is an "essential element of
213. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW
IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 18 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
books/Is sclaid-def-securingreasonable-caseloads.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/
R3ZC-S9HC].
214. See AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUINGQUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin-
istrative/legal-aid-indigent-defendants/is sclaid defbpright tocounsel in criminal-pro
ceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/YH5X-9TM9].
215. See id.
216. See id. at 7.
217. See id. at 9.
218. See id. at 16.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 26.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 13-14.
224. See id. at 10, 14.
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the criminal justice process" and that it is necessary to the legitimacy of
convictions. 225
F. INFORMANTS
Testimony by informants is yet another potential source of wrongful
convictions. Estimates of wrongful convictions involving false informant
testimony range from 20% to 50%.226 Broad police authority and
prosecutorial discretion allow the government to easily induce offenders
to become informants. 227 Fear of prosecution is probably the leading mo-
tivation for informants to testify.228 Prosecutors also secure testimony
through contingent "fee" agreements.229 Under such agreements, prose-
cutors offer witnesses lenient plea bargaining, grants of immunity, and
sometimes even government subsidies to testify against a defendant.230
Although providing witnesses with such inducements could encourage
false testimony against a defendant, contingent fee agreements are gener-
ally upheld unless there is direct evidence of perjury.231 If there is an
"invitation to... commit perjury," though-such as when the informant
can trigger his contingent benefits only by achieving a particular out-
come-some courts might find a violation of due process. 232 Such result-
oriented contingency agreements have been subjected to greater
scrutiny.233
In some instances, complex schemes to exchange perjured testimony
for benefits like more lenient sentencing have been uncovered. Take, for
example, the story of Ann Colomb. In 2006, she and her three sons were
convicted in federal court for "allegedly running one of the largest crack
cocaine operations in Louisiana. ' 234 Much of the testimony at trial was
from jailhouse informants who had purchased documents and photo-
graphs to help fabricate testimony in the hope of receiving reduced
225. Id. at 13.
226. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE ERO-
SION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 70 (2009).
227. See id. at 46-50.
228. See DENNIS G. FITZGERALD, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 22 (2007). Some informants, how-
ever, are motivated by merely their senses of civic duty. See id. at 25.
229. See id. at 94-95.
230. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (stating that "compensation (either immunity from
prosecution, reduced charges, sentence reduction, or cash) by the government to cooperat-
ing witnesses in criminal prosecutions" is an exception to the "general rule [that] payments
to witnesses in return for testimony are considered unethical and illegal" and that use of
this exception is far from rare).
231. See FITZGERALD, supra note 228, at 95.
232. See id. at 95-96.
233. See id. at 96-97.
234. Randy Balko, Guilty Before Proven Innocent, REASON.COM (Apr. 14, 2008, 12:00
PM), http://reason.com/archives/2008/04/14/guilty-before-proven-innocent/print?utm-
source=huffingtonpost.com&utm medium=referral&utm campaign=pubexchange-article
[http://perma.cc/Z53G-4S7F]; see United States v. Colomb, 448 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753 (W.D.
La. 2006) (noting these convictions).
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sentences. 235 While the Colombs were in jail awaiting sentencing, evi-
dence of the unreliability of the jailhouse informants' testimony was un-
covered, and all of the charges against the Colombs were dismissed.236
G. EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT BIAS
Another factor possibly contributing to wrongful convictions is the
presence of biases in any step of the process.237 While explicit biases of
racism, sexism, and the like are clearly problematic, there is also the con-
cern about the pernicious implicit biases that exist throughout the crimi-
nal justice system.238 Implicit biases are "attitudes or stereotypes that
affect our understanding, decisionmaking, and behavior, without our
even realizing it." '239 In many circumstances, these biases-in particular
many of our unconscious cognitions about race, sex, and ethnicity-are
problematic and pose difficulties for the fair administration of our crimi-
nal justice system.240 These unconscious biases can affect everyone in a
legal proceeding, from the police, to the prosecutor, to the judge and
jury.241 For example, police officers' implicit biases could affect who they
view as suspect and how they exercise their discretion in employing
searches and arrests.242 Judges might be similarly biased against certain
types of claims, particular litigants, or particular attorneys, without even
being aware of it, and these biases could potentially affect the outcomes
of objections, motions, convictions, and appeals.243 A juror could also be
biased and thus skew the outcome of a trial.2 44 Witnesses' biases could
235. See Balko, supra note 234.
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L.
& Soc. Sci. 427, 439 (2007) ("Implicit biases appear to be widespread ...."). Bound up
with this concept of bias is that of heuristics. See Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and
Criminal Defendants, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 249, 251 (2007). According to Professor
Oldfather, heuristics are "mental shortcuts ... that generate behavior that, while often at
least roughly in accord with the prescriptions of rationality, will systematically depart from
it in significant ways." Id. Biases are "distortions in our thought... that render us unable
to rationally assess the information with which we are presented." Id.
238. Some scholars argue that it is difficult to distinguish between explicit and implicit
biases. See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1058 (2009).
239. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1126
(2012).
240. See id. at 1128-29; Lane et al., supra note 237, at 429.
241. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the
Legal System, 46 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2013); see also Kang et al., supra note
262, at 1130-31, 1135-51 (explaining that research demonstrates that "implicit bias is per-
vasive (widely held), large in magnitude (as compared to standardized measures of explicit
bias), dissociated from explicit biases .... and predicts certain kinds of real-world behav-
ior," and stating that "implicit biases can have an important impact" throughout the pro-
cess of investigating and adjudicating a criminal case).
242. See Kang et al., supra note 239, at 1135.
243. See Bassett, supra note 241, at 1564.
244. See id.; see also Kang et al., supra note 239, at 1144-45 (summarizing a study by
Levinson and Young "suggest[ing] that implicit bias ... was influencing how jurors as-
sessed the evidence in [a] case").
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affect their memories and thus their testimony in court.245 Even a defen-
dant's own implicit biases could skew his individual perception of the fair-
ness of a proceeding.2 46
One of the major sources of information about the existence of implicit
biases comes from the Implicit Association Test (IAT).247 In this test,
subjects are asked to "rapidly classify individual stimuli into" particular
categories, and the subjects' rates of classification are then measured.248
For example, subjects are asked to categorize images of individuals' faces
as either "African American" or "European American. ' 249 They are also
asked to categorize particular words, like "glorious" or "nasty" into cate-
gories of "Good" or "Bad. '250 Subjects are then asked to sort individuals'
faces and particular words into categories of "African American or
Good" or "European American or Bad. '2 51 They are similarly asked to
sort individuals' faces and particular words into categories of "European
American or Good" or "African American or Bad. ' 252 The subjects' im-
plicit biases are then measured based on how their speeds and accuracies
vary as particular racial groups are associated with "Good" or "Bad. '253
Social scientists rely heavily on this test in assessing implicit biases,2 54 and
it is a useful resource because the test is easily accessible to anyone with
internet access. In fact, over five million individuals have taken the
test.255 It is useful to examine one's own potential biases, so we urge eve-
ryone to take the test. Many people are surprised by their results.
The results of individuals who have taken the IAT are stark. According
to the data, implicit biases are prevalent. 256 The data show that subjects
generally "preferred socially privileged groups (young over old, white
over black,... abled people over disabled people, [etc.])," but the extent
to which subjects possessed these biases varied.2 57 "Members of privi-
leged groups overwhelmingly show[ed] ingroup preference. '258 And even
some individuals who are not members of privileged groups exhibited bi-
ases in favor of privileged groups. For example, "people of.. . Asian...
and Hispanic descent implicitly preferred white over black," and "equal
numbers of black participants preferred the outgroup white as preferred
245. See Bassett, supra note 241, at 1564.
246. See id.
247. See Lane et al., supra note 237, at 433 ("With over 5 million tests completed, this is
the largest repository of data available to look at variability and frequency of [implicit
social cognitions].").
248. See id. at 431; Take a Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
takeatest.html [http://perma.cc/F2VH-H8X5].









258. Id. at 435.
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the ingroup black. '2 59
Social scientists have also studied the implicit biases of police officers
and judges. Their experiments suggest that both police officers and
judges, like other Americans, possess implicit biases.2 60 Moreover, these
biases have also been shown to predict individuals' behaviors.261 For ex-
ample, police officers' biases appear to affect their actions.2 62 It is less
clear that judges' decisions are regularly affected by their implicit biases,
though. Still, one group of researchers found that judges with greater im-
plicit biases against blacks generaUy sentenced racially unidentified de-
fendants more harshly when they had been primed to think about blacks
prior to sentencing.263 Providing some hope for limiting how these biases
might affect decisionmaking, though, studies suggest that implicit biases
can possibly be reduced or at least that decisionmakers, provided proper
motivation, are capable of compensating for their biases.264
III. LIMITED ERROR CORRECTION ON
APPELLATE REVIEW
As can be seen, the bulk of these traps for wrongful conviction surface
at either the investigation or trial court stage. Once a wrongful conviction
has occurred, it often becomes very difficult to correct it. Even though
there are numerous possible sources of error and it is well known that
some individuals have indeed been found to have been wrongfully con-
victed, judges are limited in how they can address these problems once an
individual has been convicted. Appellate judges' hands are bound by the
limitations of standards of review and the constrictions of postconviction
procedures. Moreover, some judges are inundated with defendants'
claims that they have been wrongfully convicted, and the resources that
can be spent examining these claims are often in short supply. Further,
there is a limit to how many times a defendant's conviction can be revis-
ited. Some sense of finality in convictions is probably necessary to have a
259. Id. at 433. However, "black participants did not, on average, show ingroup prefer-
ence." Id.
260. See Joshua Correll, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020-22 (2007); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195, 1209-11 (2007).
261. See Lane et al., supra note 237, at 436-37.
262. See Correll, supra note 260, at 1020-22; Kang et al., supra note 239, at 1139 ("[W]e
have evidence that suggests that implicit biases could well influence various aspects of
policing.").
263. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 260, at 1211-15 (finding that "[j]udges' scores on
the race IAT had a marginally significant influence on how the prime influenced theirjudgment"); see also Kang et al., supra note 239, at 1147 (summarizing the study and re-
sults). Before hypothetically sentencing the racially unidentified defendants, the judges
were exposed to "Black words" at a rate too fast for them to consciously process. See
Rachlinski et al., supra note 260, at 1212.
264. See Lane et al., supra note 237, at 437; Rachlinski et al., supra note 260, at 1226-31.
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stable system of justice.265 Indeed, there is likely "a psychological benefit
to society inherent in preserving finality-the notion that justice has been
done. ' 266 Further, finality is said to further the government's "punitive
interests," deterrence, rehabilitation, limiting victims' pain, encouraging
attorneys to try their cases well the first time, and fostering quality
judging.267
A. CHALLENGED CONVICTIONS ON DIRECT APPEAL
Appellate judges facing claims related to wrongful conviction are in a
difficult position. First, actual innocence generally is not a cognizable in-
dependent claim on appeal. 268 Instead, defendants must in most instances
resort to claims focused on procedural irregularities that occurred at trial
or during plea bargaining.269 Further, appellate judges are generally not
authorized to engage in new factfinding on direct appeal. 270 Instead, ap-
pellate courts are most often bound by the factual findings of the court
below. 27 1 Relatedly, appellate judges are also ordinarily allocated a fairly
narrow scope of review. Instead of the rigorous proof-beyond-a-reasona-
ble-doubt standard that is the hurdle to conviction in a trial court, most
appellate court judges examining whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict the defendant assess whether a rational factfinder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.272 Some commen-
tators have argued that this amounts to a "no evidence" standard such
that a conviction will be upheld so long as there is some evidence of
265. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 277 (explaining that finality is said to be "important in
establishing stability in the criminal justice system so that imprisonment and punishment
are not constantly under attack by appeal or new litigation").
266. Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FoREST J.L. & POL'Y 121,
127 n.32 (2014); see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452-53 (1963); J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 149 (1970).
267. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 276-77; Ryan, supra note 266, at 127 n.32.
268. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 591, 602 (2009).
269. See id.
270. However, in some states, appellate courts engage in factfinding when reviewing a
collateral attack on a conviction. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5 (stating that the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals "shall have the power upon affidavit or otherwise to ascertain such
matters of fact as may be necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction" to issue writs of
habeas corpus and "writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, and certiorari").
271. See Findley, supra note 268, at 605.
272. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ("[T]he relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt."); see also, e.g., United States v. Frisby, 574 F. App'x 161, 163 (3d Cir. 2014)
("The critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt." (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Jackson, 443
U.S. at 318-19)); United States v. Nguyen, 758 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2014) ("The rele-
vant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.") (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting Jack-
son, 443 U.S. at 319)).
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guilt.273 Indeed, it has been argued that this standard is inadequate to
safeguard the rights of those wrongfully convicted because the evidence
shows that over 1,304 individuals have been wrongfully convicted in the
United States, and many of them were unsuccessful in having their con-
victions overturned under this rather deferential standard of review.274
Of course there are perhaps good reasons for this deferential standard
of review on appeal. Factfinders are ordinarily considered to be in a bet-
ter position than appellate judges to view the witnesses and assess the
defendant's behavior at trial. Appellate judges, in contrast, can base their
conclusions on only the cold record of the case. Further, to the extent that
criminal justice is supposed to reflect the moral intuitions of the commu-
nity it serves, jurors-being more representative of the community than
appellate judges-are in a better position to determine questions such as
whether the defendant has indeed committed an unlawful killing of a per-
son while in the heat of passion or whether the defendant was justified in
using force to defend himself.275
Even beyond issues of the standard of review, defendants claiming
wrongful conviction face other hurdles on appeal. For example, many er-
rors are waived if not properly preserved through objections at trial.2 76
While this challenge is not unique to defendants claiming wrongful con-
viction, this problem of preservation may be exacerbated in the wrongful
conviction context, as these defendants may very well have landed behind
bars as a result of less than adequate counsel at trial. And establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel is quite difficult to do. For example, in a
recent case, the Washington Supreme Court found that there was no defi-
cient performance and it was instead a tactical decision, when defense
counsel failed to request an instruction on a lesser included offense. 277 It
has also been suggested that defendants claiming wrongful conviction
273. See Findley, supra note 268, at 631-32; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 113-114 (2008) ("Opinions recite a variety of standards of review-plenary,
clearly erroneous .... some evidence, .. . and so forth-but the gradations of deference
that these distinctions mark are finer than judges want, can discern, or need. The only
distinction the judicial intellect actually makes is between deferential and nondeferential
review.").
274. See EXONERATIONS IN 2013, supra note 14, at 1 (reporting that there have been at
least 1,304 exonerations); Findley, supra note 268, at 592 ("Unfortunately, judging by the
recent evidence, especially the empirical evidence from cases in which post-conviction
DNA testing has proved that an innocent person was wrongly convicted, the appellate
process in criminal cases is largely a failure on this most important score [of protecting
against wrongful conviction].").
275. See Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. 849,
872, 874-80 (2014).
276. See Findley, supra note 268, at 608.
277. See State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888, 894 (Wash. 2014) (en banc). As Professor
Luban has explained, some "public defenders bitterly refer to the Strickland v. Washington
test of ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a showing of prejudice, as the
'warm body' test - in all but the most egregious cases, any defense counsel still capable of
fogging a mirror will be 'effective."' David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91
MicH. L. REV. 1729, 1740 (1993).
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face the hurdle of judicial bias on appeal. 278 Beyond the fact that the law
views them as guilty, judges may unconsciously view defendants claiming
wrongful conviction more skeptically simply because they have been con-
victed at trial.279 Further, appellate judges may be swayed by political
pressure. 280
Ultimately, appellate judges facing questions of wrongful conviction
are limited in their abilities to address questionable convictions. Even if
they suspect that a defendant is innocent, they generally apply a standard
of review that favors affirming the conviction, cannot engage in new
factfinding, and are limited to correcting procedural errors below. 281 Fur-
ther, there are concerns that the defendant may have waived his claim at
trial, even though this may have been more the fault of the defendant's
attorney than his own.282 And appellate judges might be unconsciously
swayed by the fact that the defendant has already been convicted.283 All
of these matters are of course not only difficulties for the appellate judge,
but they are significant hurdles that the actually innocent convicted de-
fendant face also faces.
B. COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON CONVICTIONS
If a defendant's appeal is unsuccessful, he may possibly challenge his
conviction by filing for postconviction relief, including a writ of habeas
corpus. All states provide for some type of postconviction collateral at-
tack on a conviction. 284 Postconviction relief is ordinarily quite limited,
278. See Findley, supra note 268, at 605-06. Professor Findley has explained that, for
example, "[o]n appeal, confirmation bias is likely to lead reviewing courts-which begin
with the knowledge that the defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-
to interpret information about the case in a manner that is consistent with that conclusion."
Id.
279. See id. at 606. Professor Findley explains:
On appeal in a criminal case, [cognitive] biases can make it more likely for a
court to find harmless error, or a lack of prejudice in an ineffective counsel
or Brady violation case, because the defendant's guilt looks more inevitable
in hindsight than it might have actually appeared prior to trial. Research has
confirmed that, indeed, judges (like all human beings) are susceptible to such
biases. These biases are likely reflected in the many cases in which appellate
courts have expressed confidence that the defendants before them were
guilty, or that the evidence of guilt was "overwhelming," even where DNA
later proved that the defendants were in fact innocent.
Id.
280. See id. According to Professor Findley:
[P]olitical pressures make it difficult for courts to reverse convictions, espe-
cially in serious cases. No court wants to be responsible for releasing a defen-
dant convicted of a serious crime and risk the fallout should the defendant
commit another crime. The empirical evidence indicates that pressures to be
"tough on crime" do have a significant impact on judges, especially in juris-
dictions, like most, where the judges are elected.
Id.
281. See id. at 602-05.
282. This could provide a ground for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
283. See Findley, supra note 268, at 605-06; supra note 278.
284. See generally DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVIcnON REMEDIES AND
RELIEF HANDBOOKS WITH FORMS (2013-2014 ed. 2013) (outlining postconviction proce-
dures for all of the states).
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though, and a defendant may often be limited to pursuing only particular
issues in such a petition. For example, defendants ordinarily risk waiving
the ability to raise certain issues via postconviction relief if they have not
first raised them on direct appeal. 285 The interests of finality undergird
such limitations.2 86
1. Federal Postconviction Proceedings
In the federal system, both district and appellate court judges may en-
tertain writs of habeas corpus. 287 The circumstances under which these
writs may be granted, though, are quite narrow. This is because finality of
convictions and sentences was important to Congress's passage of the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
which governs federal habeas petitions.288 Reflecting this premium on fi-
nality, habeas petitioners in custody pursuant to state court judgments
must generally exhaust state court remedies before pursuing a federal
habeas petition, 289 and their federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-
year statute of limitations. 290 Further, a court may grant these petitioners'
writs only if the relevant state court proceeding resulted in a decision that
was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
tablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" or "based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding."'291 The federal court examining
the habeas claim is also limited as to whether it may hold an evidentiary
hearing on the claim,292 and it must defer to state factfinding on relevant
285. See Felix S. Leslie, Habeas Relief for Federal Prisoners, 89 GEO. L.J. 1877, 1884
(2001) ("Failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal will generally result in waiver of
the claim."); see also, e.g., Conover v. State, 942 P.2d 229, 230 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997)
("As we have said numerous times, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act was neither de-
signed nor intended to provide applicants another direct appeal. The Act has always pro-
vided petitioners with very limited grounds upon which to base a collateral attack on their
judgments. Accordingly, claims which could have been raised in previous appeals but were
not are generally waived; and claims raised on direct appeal are res judicata." (internal
citations omitted)).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 265-67.
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
288. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) ("Congress enacted AEDPA to
reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capi-
tal cases, and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted)).
289. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
291. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The relevant statute provides:
The court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the appli-
cant shows that-
The claim relies on-
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through
the exercise of due diligence; and
1106 [Vol. 68
Cultivating Judgment
issues of fact.293 Defendants seeking habeas relief from federal court
judgments similarly face fairly narrow possibilities for relief under
AEDPA, as Congress has directed them in most instances to instead
move their sentencing court to "vacate, set aside or correct the sen-
tence. '294 These defendants are also subject to a one-year timeframe in
which they may file such a motion.295
Whether the defendant is collaterally attacking a state or federal court
judgment, AEDPA generally provides that only one such attempt may be
made.296 It allows "second or successive" petitions for writs of habeas
corpus or motions to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence in only very
limited circumstances. 297 These second or successive attempts are ordina-
rily allowed only if: (1) the defendant can establish that his claim is based
on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collat-
eral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable, ' 298 or
(2) the claim is based on newly discovered evidence that, "if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that.., no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the [underlying] offense. '299 These
strict limits on second and successive petitions also reflect the paramount
concern for finality of convictions and sentences.
The limitations on collateral attacks in the federal system are so signifi-
cant that the Supreme Court has even indicated that demonstrably inno-
cent defendants who cannot overcome these restrictions may possibly
the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
Id. § 2254(e)(2).
293. See id. § 2254(e)(1).
294. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Some commentators gloss over the distinction between such a
motion and a writ for habeas corpus under AEDPA. See Ryan, supra note 121, at 123 n.9.
295. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
296. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
297. Id. at § 2244(b)(2).
298. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) ("A claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application . . . that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless ... the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable ... "); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (providing that "[a] second or successive motion
must be certified ... by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain ... a new
rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable").
299. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) ("A claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application . . . that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless ... the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously
through the exercise of due diligence; and.., the facts underlying the claim, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense."); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (providing
that "[a] second or successive motion must be certified ... by a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals to contain ... newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing




have no remedy.300 Although a claim of actual innocence, when paired
with claims of constitutional error, may help a petitioner to overcome
some of these procedural hurdles, freestanding claims of actual innocence
likely will not survive.30 1
2. State Postconviction Proceedings
State postconviction proceedings vary greatly across jurisdictions.
Some of them resemble federal postconviction proceedings. Others are
more liberal in the types of claims that they allow to proceed and prevail.
At least six states have now recognized a freestanding claim of actual
innocence as viable on postconviction review.302 The standards and pro-
cedures for making out a claim on this ground vary. For example, in Mis-
souri, a freestanding claim of actual innocence is generally raised in a
habeas petition. 30 3 And, unlike in federal court, a petitioner may file an
original petition in the state's court of appeals. 30 4 This court may grant
the writ without an evidentiary hearing so long as all of the evidence in
the record makes a "clear and convincing showing of actual innocence
that undermines confidence in the correctness of the judgment. ' 30 5 If the
evidence on record is not sufficient, though, the appellate court may ap-
point a special master to conduct hearings on the matter.30 6 In one such
case, a special master conducted days of hearings and ultimately filed a
report that was adopted by the appellate court.307 Even if the trial court
holds an evidentiary hearing and rejects the habeas petition, the peti-
tioner may file an original writ with the court of appeals. 308 This was the
approach taken in the Ferguson case, and, there, the court of appeals ac-
cordingly determined that it owed no deference to the trial court's find-
300. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) ("We have not resolved
whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual
innocence."); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) ("Claims of actual inno-
cence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the under-
lying state criminal proceeding.").
301. See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931.
302. See, e.g., State v. Beach, 302 P.3d 47 (Mont. 2013); Gould v. Comm'r of Corr., 22
A.3d 1196 (Conn. 2011); Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282 (Tenn. 2009); Montoya v.
Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476 (N.M. 2007); Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d
202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
303. See, e.g., Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 543-44, 548.
304. See Ron Ribaudo, Habeas Corpus in Missouri: A Critical Primer, 65 J. Mo. B. 306,
310 (2009); see also Abel v. Wyrick, 574 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) ("While it
would be more expeditious, and therefore more advantageous, in most instances, for a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be made first to the circuit court in cases in which
there is a dispute as to a factual issue, no rule requires that such a petition be first filed
therein.").
305. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 543-44, 548.
306. See Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 68.03.
307. See Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 332-33 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
308. See Mo. PRAc., Civn RuLEs PRAcncE § 81.01:17 (2013); cf. Mo. Sup. CT. R.
84.22(a) ("No original remedial writ shall be issued by an appellate court in any case




ings because the petition at issue was an original filing rather than an
appeal. 309 In Illinois, freestanding claims of actual innocence arise under
the state's postconviction statute.310 So long as the claim of actual inno-
cence makes a "substantial showing" that the petitioner is entitled to re-
lief and is not patently without merit, the trial court will conduct an
evidentiary hearing.311 Any ruling as to whether a hearing or relief is war-
ranted is subject to review by the appellate court.312 Several other states
seem to apply a procedure similar to that of Illinois.313
Although there has been some reluctance by federal courts to recog-
nize freestanding claims of actual innocence, a number of state courts
have done so, employing varying procedures and implementing differing
burdens of persuasion. In these states, appellate courts seem to have
some power to manage the factfinding process to ensure the efficient res-
olution of these claims, but they do not seem to be required, in most
instances, to engage in additional factfinding or evidence gathering.
3. Other Issues Related to Collateral Attacks on Convictions
There are other impediments to appellate courts addressing collateral
attacks on potential wrongful convictions. For example, defendants who
pleaded guilty may find their access to postconviction remedies more lim-
ited than if they had not pleaded guilty.314 And some states will not allow
access to DNA evidence for postconviction relief if the defendant
pleaded guilty at trial.315Another issue that defendants collaterally at-
tacking their convictions face is significant difficulty gathering evidence of
their innocence after conviction.316 The Innocence Project reports that it
quit pursuing nearly a quarter of its cases because the necessary evidence
to establish innocence in the case had been either lost or destroyed.317
Lost or destroyed evidence is unfortunately not an infrequent occurrence.
Some jurisdictions lack the space to store the evidence and thus lawfully
purge it, while in other instances, the evidence could be lost in over-
crowded, and sometimes mismanaged, property rooms. 318 Even if the evi-
dence has not been lost or destroyed, defendants face a burden of
309. See Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40, 50-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (granting the
petition).
310. See People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1331 (Ill. 1996).
311. People v. Lofton, 954 N.E.2d 821, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
312. See id. at 834 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing on an actual-innocence claim).
313. See, e.g., Gould v. Comm'r of Corr., 22 A.3d 1196, 1209 (Conn. 2011); Montoya v.
Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 487-88 (N.M. 2007).
314. See Rebecca Stephens, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who
Plead Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommenda-
tions for Reform, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 321-27 (2013).




317. See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/DNA-ExonerationsNationwide.php [http://perma.cc/EDY7-E7YL].
318. See Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongly Convicted: Judicial Sanc-
tions for Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2893, 2918 (2009).
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showing entitlement to access the evidence.319 Simply asking the state for
permission to test DNA evidence, for example, may not be sufficient. 320
Today, all fifty states have legislated a postconviction right to access DNA
evidence. 321 But some states have limited the circumstances in which such
access is provided by, for example, denying access to defendants who
pleaded guilty. 322
IV. STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
These limitations on appellate review emphasize the importance of ad-
dressing the root sources of wrongful conviction. And some progress has
been made in this direction. Various jurisdictions have accepted that
there is a problem and have attempted to reduce the risk of wrongful
conviction by taking various new approaches to their criminal justice
systems.
A. FORENSIC SCIENCE
Within the last decade, several jurisdictions have made progress in ac-
knowledging and addressing how faulty forensic science can lead to
wrongful convictions. For example, in 1994, the New York Legislature
created a state commission on forensic science to provide training, ac-
creditation, and oversight for state forensic science laboratories. 323 Simi-
larly, in 2005, the Texas Legislature created the Forensic Science
Commission following a series of cases that raised concerns about the use
of forensic evidence in the state. 324 The Commission is charged with in-
vestigating "complaints that allege professional negligence or miscon-
duct" relating to forensic analysis.325
At a national level, concerns about the uses of forensic science in the
criminal justice system gained greater national recognition when the NAS
released its report on strengthening forensic science in 2009.326 Nearly
five years later, in January 2014, the National Science Commission, which
was proposed by the NAS report, was formed.327 This Commission is
comprised of "federal, state and local forensic science service providers;
319. See District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 61-62 (2009) (holding that
there is no constitutional due process right "to obtain postconviction access the State's
evidence for DNA testing").
320. See Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, supra note 315.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 995-995-f (2012); About the Office of Forensic Services,
N.Y. ST. Div. OF CRIM. JUST. SERV., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/aboutofs
.htm [http://perma.cc/G8DR-BF3X].
324. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (West 2014); About Us, TEX. FOREN-
SIC SCI. COMM'N, http://www.fsc.texas.gov/about [http://perma.cc/FF26-D8QV].
325. About Us, supra note 324; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01.
326. See supra text accompanying note 36.
327. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Departments of Justice and Com-





research scientists and academics; law enforcement officials; prosecutors,
defense attorneys and judges; and other stakeholders from across the
country. '328 The Commission's aim is to collaborate with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to "ensure that the forensic sci-
ences are supported by the most rigorous standards available. '329
This greater recognition of the shortcomings of forensic science disci-
plines and the steps taken to shore up the use of forensic science in crimi-
nal cases could go a long way in cutting down on a significant source of
wrongful convictions. Not only could it address the scientific matters at
issue, but it could also alert practicing attorneys and judges to the difficul-
ties posed by forensic science-as well as the powers of forensic science-
so that they take greater caution in employing these techniques to convict
and defend criminal defendants.
B. EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
There has also recently been greater recognition of the defects of eye-
witness testimony, and some jurisdictions have taken measures to im-
prove the reliability of this type of evidence used in criminal trials. Texas,
for example, has enacted statutes directing police departments to take
notice of scientific evidence about the failings of eyewitness testimony
and strengthen their procedures for obtaining this evidence.330 One stat-
ute offers a "model policy" for conducting eyewitness identification pro-
cedures but allows each law enforcement agency to adopt its own
particular policy so long as it is based on "credible field, academic, or
laboratory research on eyewitness memory" and, whenever practicable,
the procedure is conducted by an unbiased administrator unaware of the
identity of the suspect. 331 In addition to statutory solutions, some judges
have participated in addressing the problems of eyewitness testimony by
admitting expert testimony on the reliability-or lack of reliability-of
this testimony. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, has
recognized the limitations of eyewitness testimony and has admitted such
expert testimony to impeach eyewitness credibility. 332 Indeed, in Blasdell
v. State,333 the court reversed the lower court's ruling refusing to admit
expert testimony about the "weapon focus effect" 334 in response to the
victim-witness's identification of her mugger and testimony about the gun
he used to attack her.335 The court explained that the expert testimony
should have been allowed because there was a "real 'possibility' that [the
witness's] ability to make a reliable identification of the robber had been
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (West 2014).
331. See id.
332. See Blasdell v. State, 384 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 831; see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
335. See Blasdell, 384 S.W.3d at 831; JANE MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, 12:9 (2013).
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compromised." 336 Still, while several jurisdictions have begun working on
improving approaches to processes like lineups, more can be done on this
front. For example, additional jurisdictions could adopt improved proce-
dures for eyewitness identification based on recent research that speaks
to the reliability of these techniques.
C. PROSECUTORS AND POLICE FORCES
Adjustments have also been made in the areas of prosecutor and police
performance that may decrease the number of wrongful convictions. For
example, some states have statutorily mandated open-file discovery rules,
requiring the prosecution to share its information with the defendant.337
Some states, like Texas, have also enacted legislation to codify and en-
hance the requirements of Brady. Under Texas law, prosecutors are now
required to attend training relating to their duty to disclose exculpatory
or mitigating evidence.338 States have also implemented reforms such as
requiring interrogations to be recorded 339 and changing lineup proce-
dures so that they are less prone to erroneous identifications. 340
In addition to these changes, empirical evidence suggests that prosecu-
tors and law enforcement have increased their involvement in obtaining
defendant exonerations. The last few years have shown the highest rates
of cooperation from prosecutors and law enforcement so far, with prose-
cutors and law enforcement cooperating in 49% of exonerations in 2012
and 38% of exonerations in 2013.341 Today, "[p]rosecutors and police are
investing more time and resources in reviewing cases for evidence of
wrongful convictions, often correcting the wrongdoing of predeces-
sors. '342 A five-year investigation from 2007 to 2012 leading to the exon-
eration of Damon Thibodeaux is a prime example of such cooperation
between prosecutors, law enforcement, and defense attorneys.343 In Thi-
bodeaux's case, both the district attorney and the sheriff worked together
336. Blasdell, 384 S.W.3d at 830.
337. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2013) ("Upon motion of the defen-
dant, the court must order ... [t]he State to make available to the defendant the complete
files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors' offices in-
volved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.").
338. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 41.111 (West 2014).
339. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 968.073(1)(c)(2) (2015) ("It is [generally] the policy of this
state to make an audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial interrogation of a
person suspected of committing a felony .... ").
340. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52 (2013) (setting forth a number of require-
ments that lineup procedures should meet, including being "conducted by an independent
administrator" and having the eyewitness instructed that "[t]he perpetrator might or might
not be presented in the lineup").
341. See ExoNERATIONS IN 2013, supra note 14, at 3.
342. Elizabeth Barber, Exonerations Climb in US, as Prosecutors, Police Probe Wrong-
ful Convictions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
USA-Update/2014/0204/Exonerations-climb-in-US-as-prosecutors-police-prbe-wrngful-
convictions-video [http://perma.cc/UM5Q-FZ7B].
343. See Paul Purpura, Angola Death Row Inmate Who Gave False Confession Released




to help secure Thibodeaux's release after they were approached by de-
fense attorneys.344 The district attorney even consulted with a psychiatrist
about Thibodeaux's case.345 The joint investigation was described both as
"extraordinary" and "unusual, '346 but, given its success, it may become
more mainstream in the future.
Addressing the pressures on police officers and lawyers is also an im-
portant aspect to targeting the problem of wrongful conviction. One ap-
proach would be to change the employment environments at station
houses, prosecutors' offices, and public defenders' offices. Perhaps chang-
ing how effective work is assessed is part of the answer. Should police
officers' rates of closing cases be rewarded? What about prosecutors' con-
viction rates? Or are there other ways to determine that an employee is
doing a good job? One scholar has suggested that police departments'
maintenance of open police case files-similar to the open file we see in
some prosecutors' offices-could lend accountability to police work.347
Another has suggested that prosecutors' offices need some oversight-
perhaps through publicly available ratings of prosecutors' offices-so that
"tough on crime" attitudes or conviction rates are not the only metrics by
which these offices are viewed.348 Perhaps publicly funded defense attor-
neys should also be evaluated in some way. Should, for example, a juris-
diction limit its employment of a publicly funded attorney if that attorney
has been found to have been constitutionally ineffective in a previous
case? Sufficient officer and lawyer training on the sources and prevalence
of wrongful conviction could also contribute to these actors' more careful
approaches in some cases.
D. IMPROVING ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Although the Supreme Court's groundbreaking 1964 Gideon v. Wain-
wright349 decision requires effective assistance of counsel for indigent de-
fendants, the bar for what constitutes effective assistance has long been
interpreted as quite low. 350 More recently, though, courts seem to be tak-
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. See Douglas A. Blackmon, Louisiana Death-Row Inmate Damon Thibodeaux Ex-




347. See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRO-
CESS 215, 217 (2012).
348. See Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 610-15
(2014).
349. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
350. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Re-
form, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2013). Professor Lucas has summarized:
In the years since the landmark right to counsel case Gideon v. Wainwright was decided,
numerous studies have documented the plight of indigent defendants still trying to secure
equal treatment, effective representation and a fair trial. Among other things, these studies
have highlighted inadequate funding of indigent defense systems across the country and its
results: the chronic appointment of "incompetent or inexperienced" counsel, severe delays
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ing some steps to raise this bar.351 In its 2014 case of Hinton v. Ala-
bama,352 for example, the Court found that a defense lawyer's failure to
request additional funds to replace a deficient expert witness constituted
deficient performance. 353 Hinton's attorney had failed to even investigate
the state statutory allowance for defense funding which provided for
greater reimbursement than he thought. 354 In analyzing the case, the
Court was careful to differentiate the mere selection of a seemingly inad-
equate expert witness, which would ordinarily be within the realm of an
attorney's strategic decisionmaking, to which the Court continues to de-
fer, from the "unreasonable failure to understand the resources available
to [the attorney]. '355 This seems to be a slightly less deferential approach
to defense counsel than the Court has previously taken. And some lower
courts may be similarly decreasing their deference in certain areas as
well. In the case of Correll v. Ryan,356 for example, the Ninth Circuit
found ineffective assistance when defense counsel failed to sufficiently
look into the defendant's "social background, including investigation of
any family abuse, mental impairment, physical health history, and sub-
stance abuse history" for presentation in the penalty phase of a capital
case. 357 And an appellate court in Maryland found ineffective assistance
when defense counsel ceased his inquiry into a possible insanity defense
for his client when a doctor concluded that there could be no such de-
fense because the defendant had voluntarily ingested the phencyclidine
(PCP) that led to "the bizarre circumstances of the murder" for which the
defendant was convicted.358 As a result, the lawyer also failed to discuss
the possible defense with the defendant. 359
in the appointment of counsel, discontinuity of attorney representation, a lack of training
and oversight for counsel representing indigents, excessive public defender caseloads and
understaffing of public defender offices, inadequate or nonexistent expert and investigative
resources for defense counsel, and a lack of meaningful attorney-client contact. In other
words, they have revealed a two-tier system of justice in which the poor are subject to a
completely separate and wholly underresourced experience.
Id.
351. See Christopher Durocher, Are We Closer to Fulfilling Gideon's Promise?: The
Effects of the Supreme Court's "Right-to-Counsel Term," AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR L. &
POL'Y: ISSUE BR., at 1, Jan. 2013, https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Durocher-
Are We ClosertoFulfilling__GideonsPromise.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WLV-CLKU]("During the 2011-2012 Term, the United States Supreme Court handed down decisions in
five cases that open the door to expanding and better protecting the availability of effective
counsel in both the pre-trial and post-conviction stages of a criminal prosecution."); Ste-
phen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 517 (2009)(arguing that "the Supreme Court's recent ineffectiveness decisions have finally begun to
take the right to counsel as seriously as the access-to-counsel cases would require" and
"mark a dramatic shift from prior practice before and after Strickland").
352. 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
353. See id. at 1088.
354. See id.
355. Id. at 1089
356. 539 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
357. Id. at 943.




The State of Washington has seen its own unique development relating
to ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2013, a federal district court in the
state, in responding to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit brought by a
class of criminal defendants,360 identified systematic deficiencies in the
Washington public defenders' program based on the enormous case loads
of the attorneys.361 After finding a colorable claim, the court granted in-
junctive relief attempting to improve the caseloads of public defenders so
that they could adequately represent defendants. 362 Later, the state de-
veloped maximum workload standards for public defenders, which were
implemented that same year. 363
E. INFORMANTS
Another reform is to require corroboration for informant testimony.364
Texas courts, for example, examine the sufficiency of informant testimony
from accomplices or inmates by first excluding the testimony to deter-
mine if there is any other evidence tending to connect the defendant to
the crime.365 This approach, which differs from a typical inquiry into legal
or factual sufficiency of the evidence, is a legislative attempt to control
notoriously unreliable informant testimony. 366
F. REVIEWING CASES FOR ACTUAL INNOCENCE
As already suggested, all states provide some sort of postconviction av-
enue by which defendants can collaterally attack their convictions. 367
Some jurisdictions have recently been liberalizing some of these proce-
dures. Since 2011, Texas has provided an avenue for relief based on cer-
tain scientific evidence discovered after trial.368 The applicable statute
mandates a writ of habeas corpus for relevant newly discovered evi-
dence.369 It requires relief if the court finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that, had the new evidence been presented at trial, a conviction
would not have occurred. 370
Beyond procedural mechanisms for reviewing convictions, jurisdictions
have made strides to address the problem of wrongful conviction. In 2006,
360. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See WASH. ST. CT. R.: CRIM. R. Or. LTD. JUR. 3.1-Standards, http://www
.courts.wa.gov/court rules/?fa=courtjrules.list&group=clj&set=CrRJ [http://perma.cc/
X49X-LZWM]; see also In re Adoption of New Standards for Indigent Def. & Certification
of Compliance, No. 25700-A-1004 (Wash. June 15, 2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/con-
tent/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1004.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3RB-VR6W].
364. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (West 2014); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2005).
365. See Schnidt v. State, 357 S.W.3d 845, 851 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2012, pet. ref'd).
366. See id.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 284-313. See generally WILKES, supra note 284
(outlining postconviction procedures for all of the states).





North Carolina established the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Com-
mission, the first of its kind.371 "The Commission is charged with provid-
ing an independent and balanced truth-seeking forum for credible
postconviction claims of innocence in North Carolina. '372 This Commis-
sion is comprised of eight members selected by the Chief Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court.373 "The members include a Superior
Court judge, a prosecuting attorney, a defense attorney, a victim advo-
cate, a member of the public, a sheriff, and two discretionary mem-
bers. ' '374 Between 2007 and November 2013, the Commission received
1,398 claims. 375 The Commission closed 1,197 cases from the claims it re-
ceived, which resulted in four exonerations (0.03%).376 Taking a some-
what different approach, Dallas County established the first Conviction
Integrity Unit in 2007. 377 Unlike other commissions, the Unit is a branch
of the district attorney's office and is staffed by district attorneys. 378 The
Unit not only investigates claims of innocence but also prosecutes old
cases when evidence identifies different or additional perpetrators. 379
Many lawyers around the country are also doing their part by donating
their time and resources to help overturn wrongful convictions. In 1992,
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld founded the Innocence Project to assist
defendants who could be proven innocent with DNA evidence. 380 Since
then, the Innocence Project has secured more than 330 exonerations. 381
The Innocence Project was a founding member of the Innocence Net-
work, which has spawned more than sixty satellite organizations attacking
the problem of wrongful conviction, like the Innocence Project of Flor-
ida, the Center on Wrongful Convictions, and the Innocence Project of
Texas.382 While the Innocence Project has purposefully limited itself to
focusing on DNA exonerations, other members of the Innocence Net-
371. About Us, THE N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.innocencecommis-
sion-nc.gov/ [http://perma.cc/Y94R-4XDB].
372. See id.
373. See The Commissioners, THE N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.in-
nocencecommission-nc.gov/comm.html [http://perma.cc/CFM4-2SPG].
374. See THE N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.innocencecommission-nc
.gov/ [http://perma.cc/WW9S-EZ3P].
375. See Case Statistics, THE N.C. INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMM'N, http://www.in-
nocencecommission-nc.gov/stats.html [http://perma.cc/T92F-WUNY].
376. Id.




380. See Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-inno-
cent [http://perma.cc/9H8X-NSJ4].
381. See FAQs: How Many People Have Been Exonerated Through DNA Testing?, IN-
NOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/faqs/how-many-people-have-been-ex-
onerated-through-dna-testing [http://perma.cc/P7HQ-8YHT].
382. See FAQs: What is the Relationship Between the Innocence Project and Other Orga-
nizations Doing Similar Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
faqs/what-is-the-relationship-between-the-innocence-project-and-other-organizations-do-




work have different criteria. For example, some member organizations
will also help with arson or shaken baby syndrome cases. 383 Some organi-
zations, though, have limitations like a minimum sentence requirement or
a time-left-to-serve requirement.384 All of these member organizations
are making progress in uncovering wrongful convictions and are develop-
ing their own specialties, but there may still be many wrongful convic-
tions that are not yet even being investigated.
Law firms large and small have even gotten involved in helping the
wrongfully convicted. 385 For example, in 2008, attorneys at Haynes and
Boone, LLP helped overturn a wrongful murder conviction in Texas. 386
In 2010, Jones Day attorneys helped overturn a wrongful murder convic-
tion in Ohio.387 Lawyers from Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP helped
overturn a wrongful murder conviction in New York in 2011.388 In 2012,
attorneys at Keker & Van Nest LLP helped overturn a wrongful murder
conviction in California.389 In 2013, attorneys from Schiff Hardin LLP
helped overturn a wrongful conviction for sexual assault in Illinois after
the defendant had already spent twenty years in prison.390 Only months
later, in Illinois, Kathleen Zellner worked to help get Ryan Ferguson's
conviction vacated. 391 These are just a handful of examples of attorneys
volunteering to help remedy the problem of wrongful conviction in the
United States.
G. CLEMENCY
Finally, clemency has long been touted as the "'fail safe' in our criminal
justice system." 392 Although each state and the federal government pro-
383. See Members, supra note 382.
384. See id.
385. Sometimes the gratitude of defendants helped by volunteers is shown by contribu-
tions to help others. In 2013, for example, Anthony Graves-an exoneree-established the
Nicole B. Casarez Endowed Scholarship at the University of Texas School of Law in honor
of the institution's graduate who assisted Graves in proving his innocence. See Samantha
Youngblood, Life After Death Row: Exoneree Anthony Graves Gives to UT Law in Honor
of Nicole Casarez, '79, Who Helped Free Him, UTLAw, Spring 2014, at 20, http://law.utexas
.edu/news/2014/04/24/life-after-death-row/ [http://perma.cc/F4U3-GZP7].
386. See News/Events, HAYNESBOONE, http://www.haynesboone.comlnews-and-events/
news/press-releases/2008/05/12/haynes-and-boone-pro-bono-team-obtains-freedom-for-
two-wrongly-convicted-murder-defendants [http://perma.cc/87PY-8XQL].
387. See Pro Bono Experience, JONESDAY, http://www.jonesdayprobono.com/experi-
ence[ExperienceDetail.aspx?exp=25489 [http://perma.cc/3S8D-J544].
388. See Pro Bono Victory in Wrongful Conviction Case "People v. Bellamy",
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, http://www.cravath.comPro-Bono-Victory-in-Wrong-
ful-Conviction-Case-People-v-Bellamy/ [http://perma.cc/NW9B-FEAY].
389. See Pro Bono, KEKER & VAN NEST LLP, http://www.kvn.com/practices/pro-bono
[http://perma.cc/YUH4-C7UN].
390. See News & Events, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-
events-exonerations/press-releases/lake-county-illinois-man-exoneratedafter-25-year-
struggle-to-clear-his-name [http://perma.cc/8PLN-PLWG].
391. See Ryan Ferguson, THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.u
mich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4304 [http://perma.cc/HB83-
MPRH].
392. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 412, 415 (1993); see also Cara H. Drinan,
Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2012) ("This power [to
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vide a mechanism for granting clemency,393 grants of clemency can be
politically motivated and capricious. 394 And in recent decades, there has
been a significant decline in grants of clemency at the state level.395 At
the federal level, U.S. Presidents have varied in their rates of granting
clemency, but, until recently, President Obama had granted fewer such
requests than any U.S. president on record, having granted just fifty-two
pardons and ten commutations since taking office in 2009.396 However,
the Obama Administration announced in April 2014 a plan to grant clem-
ency to thousands of drug offenders-a plan referred to as the clemency
initiative-and President Obama has granted an additional twelve par-
dons and seventy-nine commutations in 2015, now surpassing Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Theodore Roosevelt.397
If evidence surfaces suggesting that an individual is actually innocent of
the crime for which he was convicted, then perhaps that individual has a
greater chance at receiving clemency. For example, Marvin Anderson was
pardoned in 2002 after DNA testing excluded him as a perpetrator, and at
least 232 other individuals have been pardoned for similar reasons. 398 On
a broader scale, Illinois's former Governor George Ryan cleared his
state's death row in 2003 when he commuted all of the state's death
sentences to sentences of life without parole due to his concerns that
these individuals could be innocent and that capital punishment is un-
grant clemency] is deeply rooted in American history, and as recently as the first half of the
twentieth century, clemency grants were a regular feature of our criminal justice system.").
393. See Drinan, supra note 392, at 1124; Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:/
/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency [http://perma.cc/D69G-FKNU].
394. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV.
561, 588-90 (2001) (stating that "clemency can be used to achieve political ends that have
little or nothing to do with enhancing justice" and discussing how several U.S. "Presidents
have on numerous occasions availed themselves of the pardon power in pursuit of these
ends"). But see Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency
and Its Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 304 (2003) (suggesting "that many standard political
factors assumed to influence clemency decisions might be overstated").
395. See Drinan, supra note 392, at 1124.
396. See Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/
clemency-statistics#obama [http://perma.cc/4PSN-V7CC]; Katie Zezima, President Obama
Has Granted Clemency Fewer Times than Any Modern President, WASHINGTONPOST.COM(Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/25/obama-is-call-
ing-for-an-increase-in-clemency-applications-but-hes-granted-it-fewer-times-than-any-
modern-president/ [http://perma.cc/2FXB-8FV4].
397. Sari Horwitz & Katie Zezima, Justice Department Prepares for Clemency Requestsfrom Thousands of Inmates: Attorney General Holder Expects Thousands of Applicationsfrom Non-violent Drug Offenders, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/justice-department-prepares-for-cemency-requests-from-
thousands-of-inmates/2014/04/21/43237688-c964-1 le3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html
[http://perma.cc/MAX7-TUS8]; see Clemency Project Overview and FAQs, NAT'L ASS'N
CRIM. DEF. LAW, http://www.nacdl.org/clemencyproject/ [http://perma.cc/Z5HG-W8ED].
398. See Brief of Eleven Individuals Who Have Received Clemency Through DNA
Testing as Amici Curiae In Support of Respondent at 1-3, Dist. Attorney's Office v. Os-
borne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (summarizing Marvin Anderson's story along with other indi-





fairly imposed. 399 But even when there has been some demonstration
that the individual in question could be innocent, or that the punishment
is broadly unfairly imposed, the review of clemency petitions can be
fraught with political considerations.400 Broader approaches to clemency,
though, could possibly open up this avenue as a more viable approach to
righting wrongful convictions.
V. MORE WORK TO DO
Despite the strides that have been made to address the problem of
wrongful conviction, still more can be done. Perhaps the most important
way to address the problem is to educate lawyers, and especially judges,
on critically examining the ways in which individual defendants are
convicted.
First, it is important to acknowledge that our system is deficient in cer-
tain respects.40 1 When confronted with assertions that an individual may
have been wrongfully convicted or that conviction tools may be unrelia-
ble, judges react in various ways. Some judges are eager to learn more.
Others stick their heads in the sand, refusing to accept that the system has
convicted innocent individuals or that tools relied on for more than a
hundred years could actually be unreliable. For example, several courts
have ruled that, "while the principles underlying fingerprint identification
have not attained the status of scientific law, they nonetheless bear the
imprimatur of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert commu-
nity, but in the courts as well."'402 Even though these judges recognize
that there is little to no scientific foundation for fingerprint evidence, they
399. See Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in
Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/O1/12/us/citing-issue-
of-fairness-governor-clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html [http://perma.cc/9N7D-GN4C]
("'The facts that I have seen in reviewing each and every one of these cases raised ques-
tions not only about the innocence of people on death row, but about the fairness of the
death penalty system as a whole,' Governor Ryan said this afternoon. 'Our capital system
is haunted by the demon of error: error in determining guilt and error in determining who
among the guilty deserves to die."').
400. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 269-70 (describing events that took place after evi-
dence suggestive of Cameron Todd Willingham's innocence surfaced that some individuals
have characterized as political maneuvering by the Texas governor).
401. See SIMON, supra note 347. Professor Simon explains:
There is little doubt that the self-assurance in the accuracy of the process
caters to important psychological and societal needs. For one, people tend
toward favorable assessments of the prevailing social order, deeming it to be
just and legitimate. More importantly, the mere notion that the state can
wreck the lives of innocent people casts a disconcerting shadow over the in-
tegrity of the system and is bound to pose a threat to the psyche of the peo-
ple involved in its operation. Ironically, a natural response to threats of this
kind is to deny their existence .... [But] [t]he prospects of reform are to a
large extent contingent on the prospects of altering these two pervasive
mindsets.
Id.
402. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., United
States v. Joseph, No. CR. A. 99-238, 2001 WL 515213, at *1 (E.D. La. May 14,2001) (stat-
ing that "fingerprint analysis has been tested and proven to be a reliable science over
decades of use for judicial purposes" and that "fingerprint technicians utilizing both the
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refuse to accept that this poses a problem and creates a possible risk of
wrongful conviction. Still other judges understand that some of the tools
and processes for convicting individuals have flaws that heighten the pos-
sibility of wrongful conviction, but these judges are understandably over-
whelmed with what this might mean for the criminal justice system as a
whole and also feel powerless to do anything about it. If we cannot rely
on fingerprint evidence, for example, then what can we rely on? And
won't the entire criminal justice system unravel if we recognize that some
of these tools of conviction might be invalid? Finally, some judges resort
to conducting their own independent research-often on the internet.
This raises its own questions about whether such an independent investi-
gation comports with the applicable judicial rules of conduct. 40 3 Regard-
less of the type of judge involved, though, it is important for them to
recognize that there are some significant faults in the tools regularly used
today to convict individuals. The first step in addressing this problem is
changing the judicial culture of rebuff in this regard. If we cannot see that
a problem exists, it is going to be difficult to address it.
Once legal decisionmakers are open to the possibility of a problem,
they have to possess the skills to effectively examine the science or social
science behind the tools employed to convict defendants. In addition to
competence, it is important that these legal decisionmakers possess the
confidence that they can effectively examine these scientific tools. Judicial
education-and the education of police officers, lawyers, and the public
more generally-is important in this regard.
Before education, though, it is essential to have basic research on
which to build this education. A critical examination of the tools used to
convict defendants should spur much needed additional research on the
reliability of these traditional tools. Some relatively straightforward re-
search could lend greater understanding to matters such as the error rates
in fingerprint examiners' match determinations and the extent to which
fibers can be individuated. It is also crucial that these results are well
publicized so that practitioners, judges, lawyers, and even the general
public, are aware of the limitations of the various conviction tools em-
ployed today. Certainly sufficient funding would be necessary to carry out
the necessary tests to shore up the various areas of analyses and to widely
communicate the results. The proposals set forth in the 2009 NAS report
on strengthening forensic science are also worthy of consideration. 4°4 The
lack of standards and accreditation that are pervasive in the forensic sci-
ence disciplines are surely part of the problem of much of modern foren-
sic evidence's reliability gap, and the lack of standards and strict
Galton and ridgeology techniques follow established principles and use scientific methods
that are recognized in their particular field").
403. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits
on Independent Research, 28 REV. LrrG. 131 (2008) (examining whether the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibits independent judicial research, especially in the areas of sci-
ence and social science).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
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adherence to standards, are problematic in the criminal investigation bus-
iness overall. There could be resistance to change from practitioners or
individual jurisdictions, and their views are worthy of sincere considera-
tion, but the importance of achieving greater reliability of the tools of
conviction is key.
Once there is sufficient research supporting the basic tools of convic-
tion (or perhaps research suggesting that some of these tools should be
abandoned), effective judicial education, and education more broadly,
can begin. To the extent that there have already been attempts to educate
judges on research that may bear on legal questions, these attempts have
generally taken a categorical approach. Some lawyers and scientists have
tried to teach judges about discrete areas of the law. There has not been
much assessment as to the effectiveness of this strategy, but, to the extent
it has been effective, the returns are likely limited to the discrete areas of
research in which a judge is trained and limited to the scientific progress
made at the time of the training. Perhaps a broader, and in some ways
more basic, approach would be more effective. Judges and other deci-
sionmakers need to learn how to assess the reliability of scientific re-
search for themselves. This means that judges should be taught about
basic scientific methodology so that they can effectively read scientific
studies and competently assess the quality of the research performed.
This may sound like a daunting task. But judges are generally intellectu-
ally curious, intelligent, and fast learners. Armed with general scientific
skills, judges educated in this broader fashion could come to scientific
questions from a confident and informed position. Certainly, for judges to
competently assess scientific studies could be quite time consuming. But
having a stable of knowledgeable judges will likely shift the focus from
hoodwinking judges to offering up sound science.
Finally, it is essential that legal decisionmakers acknowledge that they
are fallible and that, despite being endowed with incredible power within
the system, they, too, are vulnerable to bias. Certainly, education is a cru-
cial component of addressing the wrongful conviction problem. But it is
essential to train not only on the sources of wrongful conviction and the
limitations of the tools of conviction; it is also important to educate the
relevant decisionmakers on the topic of explicit and implicit biases. Many
people believe that they are fair and unbiased. But research suggests that
most people harbor at least some implicit biases;40 5 it is very difficult in
our society not to harbor them. And research suggests that even some
racial minorities harbor some implicit biases against their own racial
group and members of other minority racial groups.40 6 Perhaps at least
405. A common test for determining whether you harbor implicit biases can be found at
Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html [http://perma.cc/J54W-
DEN6]. People are often surprised by their results.
406. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 956 (2006) ("African Americans constitute the only
subgroup of respondents who do not show substantial implicit pro-[European American]
race bias on the Race IAT. Approximately equal percentages of African Americans dis-
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making actors-such as judges, jurors, lawyers, and police officers-
aware of these possible biases, and motivating them to account for these
biases, could help them achieve results less affected by these unconscious
views.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is evidence that our system continues to convict innocent per-
sons. This error rate may be less than 5%,407 but, still, innocent individu-
als are being convicted and punished. A system in which no innocent
individuals are convicted may be impossible. Indeed, our accepted bur-
den of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-contemplates the implausibil-
ity of certainty of guilt before conviction. But, if there are feasible ways to
improve our error rate, to cut down on the number of people wrongfully
convicted, then it makes sense to pursue these strategies. There are many
possibilities for reform. Jurisdictions could adopt the reforms already im-
plemented in some states-such as improving identification procedures
and recording interrogations. Greater oversight related to police officers',
prosecutors', and defense attorneys' work in cases could likewise be im-
plemented. And jurisdictions could invest in educating judges, lawyers,
police officers, and the general public about scientific research related to
the reliability of forensic evidence, eyewitness identifications, confes-
sions, and informant testimony. Jurisdictions could also educate about the
power of explicit and implicit biases.
There are many avenues for reform. Some may require greater finan-
cial resources and others may require greater efforts to sell the ideas to
the public. But many of these approaches require further education.
Making everyone aware of the problem of wrongful conviction, and the
ways by which wrongful conviction can occur, is an essential component
of addressing the problem. Educating decisionmakers on biases and the
basics of scientific methodology could also have an important impact on
addressing this concerning problem of wrongful conviction.
played implicit bias in the pro-[African American] and pro-[European American] direc-
tions."); Lane et al., supra note 260, at 237; supra note 259 and accompanying text.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
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